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TRIBAL BONDS: STATUTORY SHACKLES
AND REGULATORY RESTRAINTS ON TRIBAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*
GAVIN CLARKSON**
Upwards of $50 billion in capital needs go unmet each year in
Indian Country in such vital sectors as infrastructure, community
facilities, housing, and enterprise development, in part due to the
restrictions imposed on tribal access to the capital markets,
specifically the ability of tribal governments to issue tax-exempt
debt. Section 7871 of the Internal Revenue Code requires tribal tax-
free bond proceeds to be used only for "essential governmental
functions, "a restriction not applicable to state and municipal bonds,
and § 7871(e) further limits the scope of available tax-exempt
bonding to activities "customarily performed by State and local
governments with general taxing powers" without providing any
guidance as to when a particular activity becomes "customary" for
a non-tribal government.
These restrictions have severely limited tribal abilities to access the
capital markets, and although American Indians make up more
than 1.5% of the population, tribes issued less than 0.1% of the tax-
exempt bonds between 2002 and 2004. These restrictions harm the
poorer tribes the most, as the differential between tax-exempt and
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taxable interest rates often determines the feasibility of a project.
Without access to tax-exempt rates, poorer tribes simply cannot
afford the debt service required to address glaring economic and
infrastructure deficiencies.
Tribal governments are also victims of a disproportionate number
of enforcement actions by the IRS. The IRS audits less than 1% of
the tax-exempt municipal offerings each year, but direct tribal tax-
exempt issuances are thirty times more likely to be audited within
four years of issue than city and state issuances. In addition, 100%
of tribal conduit issuances have been or are currently being
challenged by the IRS. The ambiguity of the statute has led to a
number of IRS enforcement actions that simply would not have
happened had the issuer not been a tribe. In each of these cases, the
tribes financed activities that had previously been routinely financed
by state and local governments without any challenge from the IRS.
This Article argues that tribal governments should have the same
tax-exempt bonding authority as their state and local counterparts,
and that expansion of tribal bonding authority would increase
federal revenues.
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INTRODUCTION'
Promoting economic development is a traditional and long
accepted governmental function, and there is no principled way
of distinguishing it from the other public purposes the Court
has recognized.'
1. Portions of this Introduction have been adapted from the author's testimony
before the Senate Finance Committee. Gavin Clarkson, Assistant Professor, Univ. of
Mich. Sch. of Info., Sch. of Law & Native Am. Studies, Written Testimony Before
Subcommittee on Long-Term Growth and Debt Reduction of the U.S. Senate Committee
on Finance (May 23, 2006), available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/
testimony/2005test/052306testgc.pdf.
2. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 470 (2005) (syllabus).
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Just like state and local governments, Indian tribes, as separate
sovereign governments, have an obligation to improve the lives of
their citizens. When such governmental entities engage in economic
development activities to elevate the economic status of their
constituencies, they often seek outside funding to finance those
activities. Many tribal governments, however, are still suffering from
the impacts of historical federal policies.' Additionally, tribal
communities are often burdened with extremely low socioeconomic
factors, including low educational achievement,4 high unemployment,5
high poverty,6 and low per capita income.7 For many tribes the only
source of capital to address these problems is limited to grants and
other assistance from the federal government, but such "funds are
often insufficient to address the myriad responsibilities facing tribal
governments."8
Contrary to popular belief, gaming does not provide sufficient
funds to meet the needs of all tribal governments, as most of the more
than 560 federally recognized Indian tribes9 do not have any form of
gaming operations,"° and of those that do, only a small handful
generate significant revenues." While a small number of tribes near
major metropolitan centers have started successful gaming
enterprises, hundreds of tribes have not entered the gaming industry,
3. See infra Part II.
4. RAYMOND C. ETCITTY, ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT & GOV'T ENTITIES,
TRIBAL ADVICE AND GUIDANCE POLICY, at 11-7 (2004), http://ftp.qai.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/act_rpt3_part2.pdf.
5. Average unemployment on Indian reservations is 13.6% (with some reservations
having unemployment levels above 50%). Id. at 11-7 n.17. "The general U.S. population
has [an] unemployment rate of 5.8% ...." Id.
6. The average percentage of American Indians living in poverty is 25.67%,
compared with 12.38% for the general population. Id. at 11-7 n.18.
7. Per capita annual income for American Indians is $12,893, compared to the
overall U.S. average of $21,587. Id. at 11-7 n.19.
8. Id. at 11-7.
9. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,194, 71,194-98 (Nov. 25, 2005).
10. According to the National Indian Gaming Association, only 224 tribes had gaming
operations of any kind as of 2005. See NAT'L INDIAN GAMING ASS'N, AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INDIAN GAMING IN 2005, at 2, available at http://www.
indiangaming.org/NIGA econ-impact_2005.pdf.
11. See NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT
STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 2-10 (1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
ngisc/reports/2.pdf ("The 20 largest Indian gambling facilities account for 50.5 percent of
total revenues, with the next 85 accounting for [only] 41.2 percent. Additionally, not all
gambling facilities are successful. Some tribes operate their casinos at a loss and a few
have even been forced to close money-losing facilities.").
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and many that have participated actually operate casinos located "far
from population centers."12
"[E]xtensive land bases spread out communities and homesteads,
... mired in one long-standing poverty cycle" characterize most
reservations. 3 In fact, the need for economic development in Indian
Country remains acute and affects nearly every aspect of reservation
life, as most Indian tribes have an economy that is on par with third-
world countries. The unemployment rate, for example, hovers
around 50% for Indians who live on reservations, nearly ten times
that for the nation as a whole, and almost one-third of American
Indians live in poverty.14
All too many tribal governments lack the ability to provide the
basic infrastructure most U.S. citizens take for granted, such as
passable roadways, affordable housing, and the plumbing, electricity,
and telephone services that come with a modern home. According to
the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately 20% of American Indian
households on reservations lack complete plumbing facilities,
compared to 1% of all U.S. households.15 "About 1 in 5 American
Indian reservation households dispose of sewage by means other than
public sewer, septic tanks, or cesspool. ... "16 The Navajo reservation
is the same size as West Virginia, yet it has only 2,000 miles of paved
roads while West Virginia has 18,000 miles. 7  Investors and
employers, even in the most distressed inner cities of the United
States, take roads, telephones, electricity, and the like for granted.
Their absence from large portions of Indian Country poses a daunting
barrier to tribal leaders' attempts to attract new private sector
investment and jobs.
Such realities highlight the importance of stimulating economic
development to create economic opportunity for tribal members.
12. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16,
2002, at 44.
13. Entrepreneurial Sector Is the Key to Indian Country Development, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 6, 2002, at A2, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfm?id=1031321315.
14. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUB. NO.
2005-116, AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN: FINDINGS FROM THE
BASE YEAR OF THE EARLY CHILDHOOD LONGITUDINAL STUDY, BIRTH COHORT 3
(2005), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005116.pdf.
15. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSING OF AMERICAN
INDIANS ON RESERVATIONS-PLUMBING 3 (1995), available at http://www.census.gov/
apsd/www/statbrieflsb95_9.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Michael J. Kurman, Indian Investment and Employment Tax Incentives, 41 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 578,583 (1994).
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Many scholars, investors, and tribal officials charged with developing
their economies are well aware that access to capital for tribes and
individual Indian entrepreneurs is a significant and pressing problem.
The unanswered question is one of capital formation: how do tribes
obtain the necessary capital to build a permanent economic base?
The answer should be to access the capital markets in the same way
that state and local governments do to finance their own economic
development activities, but as this Article will demonstrate, severe
impediments to a level playing field continue to plague Indian
Country.
State and local governments obtain revenues to finance their
operations primarily through three channels: tax revenues,
borrowing, and federal grants.18 Borrowing has increasingly become a
favored method of raising revenue for state and local governments.19
These entities may, with some exceptions, issue so-called "tax-
exempt" bonds under § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Tax
Code").2" This tax-exempt status of municipal bonds has been a part
of the Federal Tax Code since its adoption in 1913.21 One
commentator explains that a tax-exempt bond is "a debt security in
which the interest portion of the debt service paid is not included in
gross income."'22 The tax-exempt status of municipal debt allows state
and local governments to issue bonds at lower interest rates, since the
income from those bonds results in the same level of after-tax income
for taxpayers in higher tax brackets.23
18. M. DAVID GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING
§ 1.04 (2003)
19. Such obligations fall under the heading of "municipal securities" in § 3(a)(12) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 884 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (2000)). The applicable definition under this section for our purposes
describes a municipal security as "direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to
principal or interest by a State or any political subdivision thereof or any agency or
instrumentality of a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipal corporate
instrumentality of one or more states." Therefore, municipal security or municipal debt,
when used in this Article, can refer to a state, municipality, or an agency or instrumentality
of either.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
21. Eric J. Gouvin, Radical Tax Reform, Municipal Finance, and the Conservative
Agenda, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 424 (2004).
22. ROBERT A. FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE § 1:2.2
(2002).
23. To illustrate this phenomenon, assume that a taxpayer whose effective federal tax
rate is 35% purchases a $1000 taxable bond from a corporation that pays interest of 10%.
She will receive an annual interest payment of $100, but she must pay $35 of that in taxes,
resulting in a net income of $65. If she were to purchase a $1000 tax-exempt bond from a
municipality that pays 6.5% in interest, she would still receive $65 and would be
economically indifferent between the two bonds, assuming that all other attributes of the
1014 [Vol. 85
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Unfortunately, such an advantage is generally not available in
Indian Country. While many tribal economies still resemble those of
a third-world country, a small number of tribal economies have been
able to expand,24 and approximately 15% of the tribes25 have been
able to obtain tax-exempt financing from a variety of lenders26 to
"finance economic development activities and infrastructure
improvements., 27 Most tribes, however, are still unable to access the
capital markets competitively, if at all. The primary roadblocks to the
tax-exempt bond market are certain provisions of the 1982 Indian
Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act ("Tribal Tax Status Act"),28 part
of the Tax Code. While the goal of the Tribal Tax Status Act was to
treat tribes and states equally in the Tax Code, 9 the Act falls far short
of achieving the goal of equal treatment desired by tribes3" and in fact
substantially limits the ability of tribes to raise debt for economic
development activities. Although the Tribal Tax Status Act extended
"certain tax provisions to American Indian tribal governments on the
same basis as such provisions apply to States,"31 it did not recognize
bonds were equivalent, such as the risk of default and the dates of payment. Thus, the
municipality can raise the same amount of capital as the corporation for substantially less
in interest expense.
24. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 21.03[1] (LexisNexis
2005) (1941) [hereinafter COHEN 2005] (Professor Clarkson was a contributing author for
this most recent edition of the Handbook, providing material on tribal finance, tribal
corporations, economic development, and intellectual property). The Handbook was
substantially revised and reissued in 1982. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW (Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (1941) [hereinafter COHEN 1982].
25. GAVIN CLARKSON, RESULTS OF JOINT RESEARCH EFFORT BY THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SCHOOL OF INFORMATION 2
(2006), http://www.tribalfinance.org/Publications/IRSresearch.pdf; see also Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,194, 71,194-98 (Nov. 25, 2005) (listing the federally recognized
Indian tribes). This research summary is the result of a joint research project between the
author and the Tax Exempt Bonds division of the IRS. See also infra Part III.E.
26. FITCH RATINGS, REVENUE CRITERIA REPORT: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE
BOND MARKET 1 (2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
27. COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 21.03[1]; see also TOWNSEND HYATT, PERRY E.
ISRAEL & ALAN BENJAMIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN TRIBAL FINANCE (2005),
available at http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/246.pdf.
28. Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2608 (1983)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000)).
29. See 127 Cong. Rec. 11,132 (daily ed. June 2, 1981) (statement of Sen. Wallop).
30. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative
Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 368 (1994); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the
Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax
Status Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 383-89 (1985).
31. S. REP. NO. 97-646, at 2 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580,4581.
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tribes as equivalent to states for all tax purposes, specifically denying
them the elements of public finance that they desired most.32
While the federal policy of exempting from federal taxation
interest paid on state bonds issued to finance and effectuate state
policy is a recognition and affirmation of that state's sovereignty, a
similar recognition and affirmation of sovereignty unfortunately does
not extend to Indian tribes because tribes face three additional
restrictions that do not apply to their state and local governmental
counterparts. In the first instance, unlike state and local
governments, Indian tribes cannot issue private activity bonds.33
Worse, however, is the Tribal Tax Status Act's "additional
requirement"' that tribal tax-free bond proceeds only be used for
"essential governmental functions,"35 a restriction not applicable to
state and municipal bonds.36 Finally, the damage to tribal economic
prospects was compounded in 1987 when the Act was amended to
further restrict tribal tax-exempt bonding authority to projects
"customarily 3 7 financed by states and local governments.
As a result of these restrictions Indian tribes can only issue tax-
exempt debt if "substantially all" of the borrowed proceeds "are to be
used in the exercise of any essential governmental function,"38 and
"the term 'essential governmental function' shall not include any
function which is not customarily performed by State and local
governments with general taxing powers."39 Section 7871(e) does not
provide any guidance, however, as to when a particular activity
becomes "customary" for a municipal government.
Given that the federal government holds most tribal land in trust,
those lands are not available for property taxes,' and thus the tax
base of a tribe is usually insufficient for a tribe to issue general
32. See COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 21.03[2][d].
33. See HYATT ET AL., supra note 27, at 19 ("State and local governments often issue
tax-exempt private activity bonds for the benefit of nonprofit corporations, or to finance
mortgage loans for first-time low- and moderate-income home buyers, or to finance low-
and moderate-income residential rental property. Private activity bonds are also issued
for airports, docks, and wharves, solid waste facilities, sewage facilities, and certain other
facilities."). Current law bars Indian tribes from issuing private activity bonds for anything
other than a tribal manufacturing facility. See 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c)(2)-(c)(3) (2000).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c).
35. Id. § 7871(c)(1).
36. See COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 21.03[2][d].
37. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(e).
38. Id. § 7871(c)(1). "Substantially all" is not defined in the statute but is believed to
mean at least 95% of the proceeds. See HYATI ET AL., supra note 27, at 18.
39. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(e).
40. See COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 8.03[1][e].
1016 [Vol. 85
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obligation bonds.4 Since the revenue from a revenue bond is usually
linked to the project being financed, both the prohibition on private
activity bonds and the additional restriction to "customary"
governmental activity place tribes at a significant disadvantage
relative to state and local governments in the capital markets, creating
a situation that is inequitable when compared to other forms of
municipal debt.
The narrow interpretation of this language by the IRS has had a
stifling effect on tribes' tax-free bonding authority.42  These
restrictions on the scope of what can be financed with tax-exempt
debt deny poor tribes in particular the opportunity to address their
glaring infrastructure and economic development needs. Tribes with
substantial natural resources or significant gaming operations have
the option of financing certain activities on a taxable basis even if the
restrictions in the Tax Code prevent them from financing those
activities on a tax-exempt basis. Poorer tribes, however, do not have
that luxury,43 and upwards of $50 billion in annual capital needs go
unmet in Indian Country,44 in part because the debt service required
to finance the projects to meet those needs is too expensive at taxable
rates.45
The IRS's interpretation of tribal tax-exempt bonding authority
has also meant a substantially higher audit risk for tribal bonds, as
tribal governments are also victims of a demonstrably
disproportionate number of IRS enforcement actions. Fewer than
1% of the tax-exempt municipal offerings are audited by the IRS
41. A general obligation bond involves borrowing against the general credit of a
particular government; no specific collateral or revenues are pledged.
42. See infra Part III.E.
43. Suppose that the municipality from the financing example mentioned in footnote
23 is instead a tribe. If the tribe wants to finance a project but cannot obtain tax-exempt
treatment for the debt, it will have to pay 10% in taxable interest rather than the tax-
exempt rate of 6.5%. Assume also that the revenues from the project will be insufficient
to cover the debt service at 10%, but would be sufficient at 6.5%. If the tribe has
sufficient funds from other sources (e.g., natural resources or gaming revenues) and still
wants to pursue the project, it could still issue the bonds and use those other sources to
cover the portion of the debt service not covered by project revenues. In reality, the
poorer tribes simply do not have those other sources of money available, and thus the
project is never undertaken. In addition, given the substantial balance sheets of some of
the wealthier tribes, they would likely be able to borrow at lower taxable rates than the
poorer tribes would because the wealthier tribes would almost certainly receive better
taxable bond ratings from credit rating agencies.
44. See ERIC HENSON ET AL., HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV.,
NATIVE AMERICA AT THE NEW MILLENNIUM 120 (2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
45. Clarkson, supra note 1, at 1
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each year, but direct tribal tax-exempt issuances are thirty times more
likely to be audited within four years of issue,46 and 100% of tribal
conduit issuances have been or are currently being challenged by the
IRS.47 In all of these cases, the tribes financed activities that state and
local governments had previously financed without any challenge
from the IRS. While the National Congress of American Indians and
the National Intertribal Tax Alliance have worked to remove these
inequities for years, even the venerable Wall Street firm of Merrill
Lynch is on record decrying the inequity of the tax treatment of tribes
relative to municipalities.48 This high rate of tribal audits becomes
even more troubling when one realizes that tribal tax-exempt
issuances make up only 0.1% of the tax-exempt bond market.49
In order to understand the present situation, some background
coverage is required. For those readers unfamiliar with federal
Indian law and policy, Part I of this Article discusses the nature of
Indian tribes and their relationship to the federal government,
highlighting the origins of federal Indian policy. For those readers
unfamiliar with public finance, Part II of this Article introduces
several aspects of governmental access to the capital markets,
including a discussion of the policy justifications for tax-free
treatment of municipal debt. This section also identifies those
elements of the public finance market that are either unavailable to
tribes or are only available under restrictive conditions that apply to
tribes but not to other governmental entities. Part III examines the
legislative and regulatory history of the Tribal Tax Status Act, as well
as its subsequent enforcement, providing empirical evidence of
discriminatory treatment of tribal tax-exempt bonds.
Having reviewed in detail the legislative history of the status quo
as well as differential treatment of tribes and states in IRS audit and
enforcement in Part III, the Article proceeds to advocate for an
expansion of tribal tax-exempt bonding authority. Part IV argues
that tax-exempt bonds are being used for a whole host of economic
development activities that benefit non-tribal governments, and
Indian tribes should be able to take advantage of those same
opportunities. Part IV also provides empirical evidence that the
differential treatment of tribal governments is having a significant
46. See CLARKSON, supra note 25, at 2.
47. For a discussion of IRS enforcement see infra Part III.F and note 227.
48. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch Municipal Credit Research, Indian Gaming Bond Pricing
Update (May 24, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that tribes
are forced to contend with "iniquities in the tax code").
49. See infra Part IV.E (discussing IRS enforcement).
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negative impact on the market for tribal tax-exempt bonds. Part IV
concludes with the potentially counterintuitive proposition that
expansion of tribal tax-exempt bonding authority would produce a
federal revenue enhancing result."
For some readers the discussion of the origins of federal Indian
policy in Part II coupled with Part III's description of the statutory
and agency treatment of tribal tax-exempt bonds will have
illuminated a status quo that looks uncomfortably like bias-and
under some theoretical constructs, at least, even like racism.
Assessing a practice of adverse and differential treatment for
evidence of racism requires more than rhetoric, however, because an
accusation of racism is one of the most incendiary charges that can be
leveled in our society. To that end, Part V of this Article elucidates
objective criteria for identifying racism and then analyzes the relevant
legislative history and IRS enforcement activity using that criteria.
Assuming that one or both of the prior sections proves persuasive,
Part VI takes the next step and makes a specific legislative proposal.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF TRIBAL LAW AND POLICY
The notions that led to the restrictions of tribal economic
development are not new and trace back to the origins of the United
States itself. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," the first Supreme
Court opinion involving an American Indian tribe,52 Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that "the relation of the Indians to the United States
is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where
else."53 A half century later the Supreme Court would opine that the
"relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United
States, both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the
United States has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
character."54 Even today, Supreme Court Justices find that "[f]ederal
Indian policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic. And this confusion
50. Many discussions of tax-exempt bonds identify the amount of forgone tax
revenue, see, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL TAX POLICY:
INFORMATION ON SELECTED CAPITAL FACILITIES RELATED TO THE ESSENTIAL
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION TEST 1 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d061082.pdf., but the model presented in Part IV.C shows that, for Indian Country, the net
impact on the federal treasury would be positive and not negative.
51. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
52. An earlier Supreme Court case, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823), dealt with the issue of who could acquire title to land from Indian tribes, but no
tribe was a party to the case. See id. at 543.
53. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
54. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
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continues to infuse federal Indian law and our cases."55 The concept
that so confounds both Congress and the courts is that, on one hand,
Indian tribes are separate sovereigns, "domestic dependent nations
56
that are ensconced as a "third sovereign"57 in the federal framework.
On the other hand, Congress has plenary authority over Indian
tribes.58 While the fabrication of this plenary authority has dubious
origins,59 the continued maintenance of such authority is justified by a
legal discourse whose origins were clearly based on a negative
perception of tribalism.'
55. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004).
56. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
57. In the words of Justice O'Connor, "Today, in the United States, we have three
types of sovereign entities-the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes.
Each of the three sovereigns ... plays an important role ... in this country." Sandra Day
O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 2
(1997).
58. COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 4.03[1].
59. Arguably, the Supreme Court simply made up the notion of plenary authority. In
Kagama, the Court stated that
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent
on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their
political rights.... From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to
the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by
this court, whenever the question has arisen.
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84. Unable to find a source for such plenary authority in the
Constitution, the Court held that
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection,
as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never
been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
Id. at 384-85.
60. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 588 (1832) (stating that the
"humane policy of the government towards these children of the wilderness must afford
pleasure to every benevolent feeling"); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 (1831)
("[Indians] are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of
a ward to his guardian."); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823) ("But
the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was
war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in
possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness .... ). These three
cases, often referred to as the "Marshall Trilogy," form much of the foundation for federal
Indian law. See generally COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 1.03[4][a] (providing history of
these three cases).
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The acknowledged existence of tribal sovereignty, however, has
served to balance the exercise of that plenary authority. While each
tribe has its own separate history, the struggle to maintain a separate
sovereign existence is common to most tribes. The economic
importance of that struggle cannot be overstated, particularly in the
modern context, as the "first key to economic development is
sovereignty."'" It is important to review the origins of the federal
Indian law and policy before addressing the modern context.
Although the legal principles that existed at the moment
Europeans first made contact with the Indians had their origins in
legal theories developed to justify the Crusades,62 as the competing
European nations began to expand their empires, the papacy began
to grant exclusive rights to lands as they were "discovered," including
rights of sovereignty over the indigenous populations. 63  Even after
England broke away from the authority of Rome, English law still
supported this "Doctrine of Discovery,"' although the validity of the
61. Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian Country Today,
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT, Winter 1997, at 5, 6, available at http://www.kc.frb.org/
publicat/commrein/u97pers2.htm.
62. See, e.g., Pope Innocent IV, Commentaria Doctissima in Quinque Libros
Decretalium, in THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE 191, 191-92 (James
Muldoon ed., 1977) ("[I1s it licit to invade a land that infidels possess or which belongs to
them? ... [I]t is licit for the pope to [demand allegiance, and] if the infidels do not obey,
they ought to be compelled by the secular arm and war may be declared against them by
the pope and not by anyone else."); see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 29-41
(discussing the crusading era origins of the legal doctrines which governed European land
claims in the Americas).
63. See, e.g., Bull "Inter Caetera Divinae" of Pope Alexander VI Dividing the New
Continents and Granting America to Spain (May 4, 1493), in CHURCH AND STATE
THROUGH THE CENTURIES 153, 156-57 (Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall eds. & trans.,
1967).
Wherefore, all things considered maturely and, as it becomes Catholic kings and
princes ... you have decided to subdue the said mainlands and islands, and their
natives and inhabitants ... with the proviso, however, that these mainlands and
islands found or to be found, discovered or to be discovered ... be not actually
possessed by some other Christian king or prince.
Id.; see also Bull "Romanus Pontifex" of Pope Nicholas V Granting the Territories
Discovered in Africa to Portugal (Jan. 8, 1454), in CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE
CENTURIES, supra, at 144, 146-47 (granting Portugal the exclusive right to colonize the
Canary Islands and all other parts of Africa); WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 15-18
(discussing the "universal right asserted by popes and Christian prihees to enforce
Christianity's vision of 'civilization' " in the conquest of non-European lands). See
generally Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United
States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1 (1942) (tracing the influence of Spanish law on the development of
Indian law in the United States).
64. See, e.g., Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608)
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doctrine was a subject of debate among early colonial settlers.65
Irrespective of conflicting religious interpretations of Indian rights,
"practical realities shaped legal relations between the Indians and
colonists."'  "The necessity of getting along with powerful" and
militarily capable Indian tribes dictated that the settlers seek Indian
consent to settle if they wished to live in peace and safety, buying
lands that the Indians were willing to sell rather than displacing them
by other methods.67 As a result, the English colonial governments
acquired most of the lands by purchase from the Indians.' During
this period "the Indians were treated as sovereigns possessing full
ownership rights to the lands of America."
69
At the outbreak of the French and Indian War in 1754, treaty-
making assumed a new dimension, as each of the competing
European powers sought to form alliances with the various tribes.
The military importance of treaty alliances would continue
throughout the Revolutionary War period as well. After the war,
All infidels are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies (for the law presumes
not that they will be converted, that being remota potentia, a remote possibility)
for between them, as with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian,
there is perpetual hostility, and can be no peace .... And upon this ground there
is a diversity between a conquest of a kingdom of a Christian King, and the
conquest of a kingdom of an infidel; for if a King come to a Christian kingdom by
conquest, ... he may at his pleasure alter and change the laws of that kingdom:
but until he doth make an alteration of those laws the ancient laws of that
kingdom remain. But if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel,
and bring them under his subjection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are
abrogated, for that they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of
God and of nature, contained in the decalogue; and in that case, until certain laws
be established amongst them, the King by himself, and such Judges as he shall
appoint, shall judge them and their causes according to natural equity.
Id. at 397-98. This opinion was authored by Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke, who,
coincidentally, coauthored the charter for the Virginia Company in 1606. See WILLIAMS,
supra note 62, at 201-02.
65. Compare Cheister E. Eisinger, The Puritans' Justification for Taking the Land, 84
ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 135-56 (1948) (recounting arguments of John Winthrop
that as "for the Natives in New England they inclose noe land neither have any setled
habitation nor any tame cattle to improve the land by, & soe have noe other but a naturall
right to those countries"), with Eisinger, supra, at 135-43 (recounting arguments of Roger
Williams, "'I have knowne them make bargaine and sale amongst themselves for a small
piece, or quantity of Ground.' And this they do ' ... notwithstanding a sinfull opinion
amongst many the Christians have right to Heathens Lands.'
66. See COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 1.02[1].
67. Id. Despite devastating outbreaks of disease, the Indians would continue to
outnumber the European settlers for several decades. See id.
68. Id. The Dutch similarly opted to obtain land via consented purchase rather than
more bellicose methods.
69. Id.
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however, a powerful group of tribes that had sided with the British
during the war confronted the founding fathers. Those tribes still
maintained claims to the territory between the Appalachian
Mountains and the Mississippi River. George Washington detailed
his proposed policy for dealing with the Indians in a letter to James
Duane, the head of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the
Continental Congress:
[P]olicy and [economy] point very strongly to the expediency of
being upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of
purchasing their Lands in preference to attempting to drive
them by force of arms out of their Country; which as we have
already experienced is like driving the Wild Beasts of the Forest
which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall
perhaps on those that are left there; when the gradual extension
of our Settlements will as certainly cause the Savage as the
Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho' they differ in
shape. In a word there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian
War but the Soil they live on and this can be had by purchase at
less expense, and without that bloodshed, and those distresses
which helpless Women and Children are made partakers of in
all kinds of disputes with them .... 70
Although many consider Washington's letter the founding
document of American Indian policy,71 its notion of Indians as
"savages" sits alongside the pragmatic necessity of making treaties
with the Indians.72 As the newly formed United States began its
inexorable march westward, the Indian lands usually were not taken
by force but were instead ceded by treaty in return for, among other
things, the establishment of a trust relationship,73 often in specific
70. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 1, 1-2 (Francis Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000). Francis
Prucha notes that George Washington's recommendation was adopted by the Continental
Congress. See id.
71. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN
AMERICA 44 (2005) (tracing the history of Indian policy).
72. See Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 70.
73. The scope of the trust relationship is multifaceted. "Many treaties explicitly
provided for protection by the United States." COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 1.03[1]; see,
e.g., Treaty with the Kaskaskia art. 2, Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78, reprinted in 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES 67, 67 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904) [hereinafter INDIAN
TREATIES] (providing that the United States would protect the Kaskaskia tribe); Treaty
with the Creeks art. 2, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra, at
25, 25 (providing that the United States would protect the Creek Nation). Other treaties
provided the means for subsistence. See, e.g., Treaty with the Sioux art. 10, Apr. 29, 1868,
15 Stat. 635, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra, at 998, 1001 (providing for
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consideration for the Indians' relinquishment of land.74  It is
important to note that these treaties were always entered into as
government-to-government relationships between the tribes as
collective political entities and the United States.75 "[F]rom the
beginning of its political existence, [therefore, the United States]
recognized a measure of autonomy in the Indian bands and tribes.
Treaties rested upon a concept of Indian sovereignty ... and in turn
greatly contributed to that concept., 76
For many, treating tribes as governments was clearly more a
function of pragmatism than a generally held belief that tribal
governments were legitimate sovereigns, and although the Indian
tribes regarded treaty obligations as sacred, condescending notions of
the inferiority of tribalism prompted many to question whether their
provisions were binding on the United States. During this time
period, the legal discourse of opposition to tribal sovereignty argued
that "tribal Indians, by virtue of their radical divergence from the
norms and values of white society regarding use of and entitlement to
lands, could make no claims to possession or sovereignty over
territories which they had not cultivated and which whites coveted. '77
subsistence rations for the Sioux); Treaty with the Western Cherokee art. 8, May 6, 1828, 7
Stat. 311, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra, at 288, 288 (providing for twelve months
of rations); COHEN 1982, supra note 24, at 81 ("[Elach Head of a Cherokee family.., who
may desire to remove West, shall be given, on enrolling himself for emigration, a good
Rifle, a Blanket, and a Kettle, and five pounds of Tobacco: (and to each member of his
family one Blanket,) also, a just compensation for the property he may abandon.").
74. See, e.g., Treaty with the Sioux art. II, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra note
73, at 998, 998-99 (providing that the Sioux relinquish all claims to lands in the United
States); Treaty with the Kaskaskia art. I, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 73,
at 67, 67 (providing that the Kaskaskia Indians "relinquish and cede to the United States
all the lands in the Illinois country"); Treaty with the Creeks art. IV, reprinted in 2 INDIAN
TREATIES, supra note 73, at 25, 26 (providing that the Creek nation "extinguish forever all
claims" to specified lands).
75. See, e.g., Treaty with the Sioux art. XVI, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra
note 73, at 998, 1003 (referring to the Sioux as "the Nation"); Treaty with the Wyandot,
etc. pmbl., Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 73, at 6, 6
(describing the treaty as between the United States and the Wiandot, Delaware,
Chippewa, and Ottawa nations of Indians); Treaty with the Six Nations art. IV, Oct. 22,
1784, 7 Stat. 15, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 73, at 5, 6 (describing the
treaty as between the United States and the Six Nations).
76. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 2 (1994).
77. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31
ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 243-44 (1989). Such arguments were made by several prominent
individuals, including President John Quincy Adams:
The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to the greatest part of the
country, upon a questionable foundation .... [W]hat is the right of a huntsman to
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Various political factions disagreed over whether tribalism could
survive contact with white civilization and whether the appropriate
course of action was to make the Indians assimilate into that society
or to remove them beyond the reaches of that society.78 Ultimately,
notions of tribal inferiority prevailed, and Congress passed the 1830
Removal Act.79 Several tribes in the Southeast, however, already had
treaties that secured their right to remain on their ancestral
homeland. In response, Georgia Governor George Gilmer declared
that
[T]reaties were expedients by which ignorant, intractable, and
savage people were induced without bloodshed to yield up what
civilized peoples had a right to possess by virtue of that
command of the Creator delivered to man upon his
formation-be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and
subdue it. [The practice of purchasing land from the Indians
was merely] the substitute which humanity and expediency
have imposed, in place of the sword, in arriving at the actual
enjoyment of property claimed by the right of discovery, and
sanctioned by the natural superiority allowed to the claims of
civilized communities over those of savage tribes.80
Over the next forty years, however, tribal sovereignty was
nonetheless explicitly and repeatedly recognized through treaty-
making as tribes agreed to either remove to the west of the
the forest of a thousand miles over which he has accidentally ranged in quest of
prey? Shall the liberal bounties of Providence to the race of man be monopolized
by one of ten thousand for whom they were created? Shall the exuberant bosom
of the common mother, amply adequate to the nourishment of millions, be
claimed exclusively by a few hundreds of her offspring? Shall the lordly savage
not only disdain the virtues and enjoyments of civilization himself, but shall he
control the civilization of a world? ... No, generous philanthropists! Heaven has
not been thus inconsistent in the works of its hands! Heaven has not thus placed
at irreconcilable strife, its moral laws with its physical creation!
John Quincy Adams, Oration at Plymouth (Dec. 22, 1802), reprinted in FRANK MOORE,
AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, BY THE
MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA 251,255 (1857).
78. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the U.S., to William Henry
Harrison, Governor of Ind. Te'ritory (Feb. 27, 1803) in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 70, at 22-23 ("[O]ur settlements will gradually circumscribe
and approach the Indians, and they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens of the
United States, or remove beyond the Mississippi.").
79. Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 174 (2000)).
80. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 196 (1984).
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Mississippi or cede portions of their ancestral homeland in the face of
advancing settlement.8
While the formal existence of the United States began at a point
in time when the prevailing policy recognized tribal sovereignty
through the treaty-making process, such an orientation was not
permanent. Once the removal process was essentially complete,
responsibility for Indian affairs, along with the authority to negotiate
on a government-to-government basis with the tribes, moved from
the War Department to the Interior DepartmentD although such
treaties still had to be ratified by Congress. In the 1870s, however,
Congress ceased making treaties with the Indians" and instead
developed a policy of allotting tribal lands to individual Indians' 4 that
was characterized as a "mighty pulverizing engine"85 that would
destroy tribalism and force Indians to assimilate into dominant
society as individuals.86 Notions of the inferiority of tribalism were
again a catalyst for policy change, but implementation of the policy
required recognition of tribal sovereignty. Realization of the
81. See, e.g., Treaty with the Choctaw art. III, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, reprinted in 2
INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 73, at 310, 311 (signed by Choctaw leaders at bok chukfi
ahithac-the little creek where the rabbits dance-providing for the removal from the
ancestral homelands in Mississippi and Alabama to land in southeastern Oklahoma);
Treaty with the Sioux art. II, reprinted in 2 INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 73, at 998, 998-
99 (signed by the Sioux Nation at the conclusion of the Powder River War, establishing a
reservation).
82. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 113 (1983).
83. Treaty-making with the Indians was ended by Congress in 1871: "[H]ereafter no
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may
contract by treaty ...." Act of Mar. 8, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566, reprinted in
PRUCHA, supra note 76, at 135.
84. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. The statute is also known as
the Dawes Act after Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. While the Dawes Act
represented the final, full-scale realization of the allotment policy, many treaties made
with western tribes from 1865 to 1868 provided for allotment in severalty of tribal lands.
See ROBERT WINSTON MARDOCK, THE REFORMERS AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 212
(1971).
85. In an address to Congress in 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt expressed his
sense of the assimilation policy:
[Tihe time has arrived when we should definitely make up our minds to recognize
the Indian as an individual and not as a member of a tribe. The General
Allotment Act is a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass [acting]
directly upon the family and the individual ....
Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown, but Because of Ea: Why the Good Guys
Lost in Rice v. Cayetano, and Why They Didn't Have To Lose, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317,
325-26 (2002) (quoting 15 MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 6672 (1901)).
86. Id. at 326.
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Allotment Act required negotiations with tribal governments, and
even when dismantling the governance structure of particular tribes,
such as the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, Congress still
"continued [the existence of tribes and tribal governments] in full
force and effect for all purposes authorized by law. 87
If the policy objective of the Allotment Act was to improve the
lives of the Indians, it was a colossal failure. By the 1930s it was clear
that the United States needed to change its stance on tribal
sovereignty again,88 and Congress passed the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 ("IRA"). 89 In an effort to reinforce tribal sovereignty,
the legislation allowed tribes to adopt constitutions and to reestablish
structures for governance. Post-IRA federal treatment of the tribes
was less restrictive, allowing for the popular election of tribal leaders
according to tribal laws and constitutions. 90 Congressional policy had
completely reversed itself-tribal sovereignty was now to be
encouraged rather than destroyed; however, federal Indian policy
would oscillate through one more cycle in the next half century9'
before President Nixon issued a landmark statement calling for a new
87. Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, sec. 28, 34 Stat. 137, 148.
That the tribal existence and present tribal governments of the Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole tribes or nations are hereby continued
in full force and effect for all purposes authorized by law, until otherwise provided
by law, but the tribal council or legislature in any of said tribes or nations shall not
be in session for a longer period than thirty days in any one year: Provided, That
no act, ordinance, or resolution (except resolutions of adjournment) of the tribal
council or legislature of any of the said tribes or nations shall be of any validity
until approved by the President of the United States: Provided further, That no
contract involving the payment or expenditure of any money or affecting any
property belonging to any of said tribes or nations made by them or any of them or
by any officer thereof, shall be of any validity until approved by the President of
the United States.
Id.
88. See, e.g., INST. FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION, THE
PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928) (documenting the failure of federal Indian
policy during the allotment period).
89. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000)).
90. RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD:
INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 209 (1980).
91. The period between 1945 and 1970 is referred to as the Termination Era, and was
characterized by the passage of a number of statutes that "terminated" individual tribes-
"these acts distributed the tribes' assets by analogy to corporate dissolution and afforded
the states an opportunity to modify, merge or abolish the tribe's governmental functions."
Id. at 132. Examples of this legislative activity include Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68
Stat. 718 (Klamath), and Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 909, 70 Stat. 963 (Ottawas).
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federal policy of "self-determination" for Indian nations.92 By "self-
determination," President Nixon sought "to strengthen the Indian's
sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community."93
Self-determination94 led to an increase in economic development
activity, but access to capital remained an impediment.95 President
Reagan also made an American Indian policy statement on January
24, 1983, stating his support for "self determination."96 In attempting
to give definition to "self-determination," he stated:
Instead of fostering and encouraging self-government, federal
policies have, by and large, inhibited the political and economic
development of the tribes. Excessive regulation and self-
perpetuating bureaucracy have stifled local decision making,
thwarted Indian control of Indian resources and promoted
dependency rather than self-sufficiency. 97
In 1983, President Reagan established the Presidential
Commission on Indian Reservation Economies.9" In 1984 the
Commission published its Report and Recommendations again
calling for a major shift in federal Indian policy. 99 The Commission
promulgated recommendations in the following five categories:
Development Framework, Capital Formation, Business
92. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations
for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at 3 (1970); see Indian Financing Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-53 (2000)). Perhaps the
greatest of Nixon's contributions to Indian tribal sovereignty was the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203,
§§ 102-04 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f-450g (2000)), which expressly
authorized the Secretaries of Interior and Health and Human Services to contract with
and make grants to Indian tribes and other Indian organizations for the delivery of federal
services.
93. Samuel R. Cook, What Is Indian Self-Determination?, RED INK, May 1, 1994,
http://faculty.smu.edu/twalker/samrcook.htm.
94. The key legislation of this era includes: Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified in scattered sections of
25 U.S.C.); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (2000)); Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); and Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified in scattered sections of 25 & 43 U.S.C.). See generally
COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 1.07.
95. See COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 21.03.
96. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1984).
97. Id.
98. Exec. Order No. 12,401, 48 Fed. Reg. 2309 (Jan. 14, 1983).
99. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, supra note 96,
at 7.
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Development, Labor Markets, and Development Incentives.2°
Pertinent to the instant inquiry, under Capital Formation, the
Commission recommended private ownership or private management
of tribal enterprises, amending the Securities Act of 1933 to place
tribes on the same footing as state and local governments, amending
the Tribal Tax Status Act to provide tribes with the same tax
exemptions as state and local governments, establishing an Indian
Venture Capital Fund, amending the Indian Loan Guaranty Fund
and the Indian Finance Act to minimize the role of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and encouraging the private sector to invest in Indian
country.'O°
Although some scholars are resistant to the notion that tribes
should adapt and change in order to participate in the modern
capitalist economy,"~ tribes have adapted to their environments for
millennia, and the arrival of Europeans did not diminish that
adaptiveness. Many tribes pride themselves on their ability to adapt:
the Navajos developed a thriving weaving industry using wool from
sheep brought over by Europeans,103 the Plains Indians incorporated
European horses into their culture, and the Choctaw claim that if the
Europeans "had brought aluminum foil with them Choctaws would
100. Id. at 25.
101. See id. at 39-47.
102. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 77, at 266-68. Professor Williams criticizes the IRA
and the notions of evaluating tribal corporations using westernized norms of corporate
performance because such evaluations often highlight perceived differences between
economic development in Indian Country and corporate America. He also takes issue
with the description of tribal structures contained in PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON INDIAN
RESERVATION ECONOMIES, supra note 96:
As illustrated by its derogatory nomenclature for describing tribal governments'
differences ("social welfare driven"; "patronage system"; "dependent"), the
Commission's discourse of tribal self-determination clearly devalues tribal
enterprises operated by tribal governments according to tribal values .... The
Commission's point of reference for assigning negative values to contemporary
tribalism's perceived self-determining vision of economic development is of course
the dominant society's profit driven norms. Thus, if tribalism further declines in
response to the federal government's failure to adequately fund its trust
responsibility to Indian people, tribalism's own stubbornly held difference from
the superior values of the dominant society will be blamed.
Williams, supra note 77, at 267-68. Irrespective of whether one views capitalism as good
or bad, however, the reality is that tribal nations exist within a larger capitalist system, and
any assumption that tribes cannot adapt to that system runs the risk of falling into the very
discourse that Williams decries.
103. Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary
Analysis, 50 U. KAN. L. REV 473,495 (2002).
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have been cooking with it while the other tribes were still regarding it
with suspicion.""
The evidence from the last century of tribal economic
development indicates that tribes can and must compete within the
larger capitalist environment, and given a level playing field, they can
thrive. If the competitive landscape is stacked against tribes,
however, those impediments are highly suspect if they continue to
exist with little or no legitimate purpose, given that they suppress
tribal economic development and curtail tribal access to capital.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF PUBLIC FINANCE
A. The Nature of Municipal Debt
Depending on the source of funds used to repay the debt,
municipal debt can take a number of forms, generally under the
umbrella of either general obligation or revenue bonds issued under
§ 103 of the Tax Code.
A general obligation bond can be either secured or, more
commonly, unsecured, and in the latter case the issuer will generally
promise to repay principal and interest from any of the issuer's
available funds.1"5 In both secured and unsecured general obligation
bonds, the general credit of the issuer is pledged.1"6
A revenue bond differs from a general obligation bond in that the
debt obligation is limited in terms of recourse to a specifically
identified source of revenue that is pledged to secure the debt.1 7 The
issuer does not pledge its general credit. In contrast to general
obligation bonds, revenue bonds pledge only the earnings from
revenue-producing activities, usually to project being financed. 108
One type of revenue bond important to the instant inquiry is the
private activity bond ("PAB"). State or local governments will issue
PABs to provide financing for private businesses or individuals, and
the revenues from the financed activities are then usually pledged to
104. Id.
105. See FIPPINGER, supra note 22, § 1:2.2; see also HYATr ET AL., supra note 27, at 5.
106. See FIPPINGER, supra note 22, § 1:2.2; see also GELFAND, supra note 18, § 2:05;
HYATr ET AL., supra note 27, at 5.
107. See FIPPINGER, supra note 22, § 1:2.3; GELFAND, supra note 18, § 2:13; Recourse
refers to the set of actions that the lender can take to obtain payment. In this instance, the
lender can only look to the revenues specifically pledged. If those are insufficient, the
lender cannot look to other assets of the issuer.
108. FIPPINGER, supra note 22, § 1:2.4; GELFAND, supra note 18, § 2:13.
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cover the debt service for the bonds. 09 For example, state and local
governments often issue tax-exempt PABs for the benefit of
nonprofit corporations for projects such as charity hospitals, or to
finance low-income residential rental property or mortgage loans for
first-time low-income home buyers. "' Private activity bonds are also
issued for airports, docks and wharves, solid waste facilities and
sewage facilities, and certain other facilities.'
B. Sources of Municipal Debt
Although bank debt and bond indentures both represent a
promise to pay a specific sum of money (principal amount) at a
specified date or dates in the future (maturity date) together with
periodic interest at a specified rate, each type of debt has unique
attributes and establishes a relationship with a different set of lenders.
Additionally, given the same level of earnings, an issuer will likely be
able to borrow larger amounts for longer periods by issuing bonds
rather than by borrowing from a bank.
1. Bank Debt
Commercial banks typically lend money to governmental
borrowers as part of an ongoing business relationship. For larger
amounts, a group of banks (often called a syndicate) will collectively
lend money to the borrower. A borrower can usually borrow up to
two times its annual earnings from a bank or bank syndicate, and the
term of a bank loan (or note) is generally three to five and sometimes
up to seven years.
Bank debt can also be used as temporary financing when a
borrower plans to subsequently issue more debt through a bond
offering to finance a larger project. A portion of the bond proceeds
are then used to pay off the bank note.
2. Bond Indentures
Unlike bank debt that generally has a single lender holding the
note, a bond indenture provides for negotiable instruments-bonds
that can be bought and sold in the capital markets. Thus the lenders,
or bondholders, often have no direct relationship with the issuer.
While issuing a bond is typically a more complex transaction than
obtaining a bank loan, issuers can generally borrow larger amounts
109. GELFAND, supra note 18, § 5:23
110. Id. §§ 4:25:20, 5:25.
111. Id. § 5:25.
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for longer terms. An issuer can borrow as much as three to four times
its annual revenues by issuing bonds, and the payments can be
stretched over ten, fifteen, or even thirty years in some cases.
Bond transactions often involve a financial intermediary, usually
an investment banking firm, that assists issuers in finding buyers for
the bond. By marketing to a larger audience in the broader capital
markets, the financial intermediary attempts to obtain the best
possible interest rate and terms for the issuer, which may often be
better than those available from commercial banks.
An important distinction between bank debt and bond
indentures is that unlike bank loans, bonds are classified as
"securities" and are therefore subject to a variety of securities laws.
Note, however, that § 103(c) of the Tax Code treats all obligations as
"bonds" even if they are bank loans, finance leases, installment
purchases, or actual bonds issued under bond indentures."2 Thus,
while the debt markets differentiate substantially between bank debt
and bond indentures, the Tax Code does not. For purposes of clarity,
subsequent use of the term "bonds" in this Article refers to bonds
issued under bond indentures in the capital markets and does not
include the other forms of governmental debt considered to be
"bonds" under § 103.
C. Tax-Exempt Debt
Tax-exempt debt is debt where the interest paid to the debt
holder is not subject to taxation.1 3 Because the interest is tax-free,
investors are able to generate the same after-tax return with a lower
interest rate as they would from a similar taxable investment that pays
a higher interest rate. In addition to the availability of lower interest
rates, sometimes as much as 300 basis points lower,"4 longer terms are
also available in the tax-exempt market.
1. The Historical Justification for States' Tax-Free Bond Authority:
Federal Subsidy of Governmental Obligations and State Sovereignty
When the first Tax Code was established in 1913, state and local
bond issuances were minimal and Congress desired to avoid political
112. 26 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000). This treatment is also the same for tribal debt under
§ 7871(c) of the Tax Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c) (2000).
113. See GELFAND, supra note 18, § 5:01 for a thorough discussion of the history and
policy rationale of tax-exempt municipal debt.
114. See COHEN 2005, supra note 24, § 21.03[2][d]. Financial measures are often
expressed in terms of "basis points." A 300 basis point difference is the same as a three
percent difference.
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opposition on the matter of taxing interest paid on municipal
bonds. 15 The initial rationale for the exemption has its roots in a
constitutional theory of intergovernmental tax immunity.1 6  The
modern rationale for exempting municipal bond interest from
taxation is a federal policy of supporting states in their operation as
governmental entities.'17  It has long been recognized that "[1]ong-
term debt obligations are an essential source of funding for state and
local governments""' 8 and that taxing interest paid on state and local
bonds "may strike at the very heart of state and local government
activities.""' 9
The ability to issue tax-free debt is crucial not to investors, but to
states, because investors are willing to accept lower interest rates in
exchange for the tax-exemption. 20  In effect, the tax-exemption,
although falling to the individual bond buyer, is a subsidy to the state
treasury.12 ' The federal government has an interest in subsidizing 12
115. GELFAND, supra note 18, § 1:13.
116. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 585-86 (1895) (holding
that a tax on interest income derived from a state bond, whether imposed by the federal
government or by another state, was unconstitutional as an indirect tax on the state
because of the burden it imposed on the state's ability to issue the bond). The Court
reasoned that, although the tax was imposed on the bondholder, the tax was considered to
be "on" the state because a portion of the burden, or the "incidence" of the tax, would be
borne by the state in an increased interest rate or fewer buyers. Id. The Court's rationale
was not limited to bonds in particular, but was based on a theory of intergovernmental tax
immunity under which it was unconstitutional to tax any state-derived income, whether
from bonds, employment or leases. See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 516-17
(1988) (discussing intergovernmental tax immunity at the time Pollock was decided). This
rationale was later repudiated by the Supreme Court in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939) ("The theory ... that a tax on income is legally or
economically a tax on its source is no longer tenable."). See also Baker, 485 U.S. at 523-24
(holding that interest paid on state bonds is not immune from federal taxation under the
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity).
117. As noted previously, the exemption from federal taxation for interest paid on
state-issued debt is also related to a notion of state sovereignty. See supra Introduction.
This notion of state sovereignty roughly parallels the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and
thus provides analogous support for equal tax-free bond authority.
118. Baker, 485 U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 532.
120. WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOSEPH BANKMAN & DANIEL SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 185 (14th ed. 2006).
121. Id.
122. The amount of the subsidy is a matter of empirical analysis beyond the scope of
this Article; suffice it to say, however, the subsidy enjoyed by states is significant. The
Supreme Court has recognized that without the exemption, states would have to increase
the interest they pay on bonds by between 28% and 35% over what they are able to pay
with the subsidy. Because bond revenue is so important to states, "[g]overnmental
operations will be hindered severely if the cost of capital rises by one-third." Baker, 485
U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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state and local government operations because the subsidy both
facilitates governmental operations at the local level so that the
federal government does not itself have to provide these services and
places control over what kinds of operations are undertaken in the
hands of local officials, thus removing these operations from the
federal government.'23
This latter rationale-local control-is related to a notion of
state sovereignty. Indeed, the doctrine of state sovereignty stems
from the basic constitutional structure that endows the federal
government with a limited set of enumerated powers.124 Further, the
Supreme Court has long recognized the power of the federal
government to tax states as a threat to state sovereignty.'25 To the
extent that states are sovereigns, the federal policy of exempting
interest paid on state bonds issued to finance and effectuate state
policy from federal taxation is a recognition and affirmation of that
sovereignty.1 2
6
2. Uses for Tax-Exempt Debt
States issue tax-exempt bonds not only to finance a core set of
traditional governmental purposes such as building schools, roads,
and sewers but also to finance airports, docks, commuting facilities,
utilities, mortgages, public golf courses, and even state lottery
buildings and horse race tracks.127 Changes to the Tax Code in 1986
sought to restrict this practice by placing limitations on private
activity bonds.1 2' After these changes, some municipalities began
123. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 120, at 186.
124. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381-82 (2d ed. 1988);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
125. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) ("[T]he power to tax involves the power to
destroy.")).
126. See Williams, supra note 30, at 358 ("Principles of federalism, together with
practical financial considerations, dictate that 'the capability of state and local
governments to raise and use revenue should be facilitated and enhanced whenever
possible in order that they may better serve the needs of their people.' " (quoting
Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Miscellaneous Revenues
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1977)
(statement of William E. Sudow, counsel for various Indian tribes)).
127. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 120, at 186.
128. IRS Revenue Ruling 03-116 explains the § 141 definition of private activity bonds
as follows:
Section 141 provides, in part, that a bond is a private activity bond if the bond is
issued as part of an issue that meets the private business use test of § 141(b)(1) and
the private security or payment test of § 141(b)(2). The private business use test is
met if more than 10 percent of the proceeds of an issue are to be used for any
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locating other sources of revenue to remain within the permissible
tax-exempt bounds while still supporting private use projects.
Discussing this phenomenon in the case of professional sports
stadiums, Professor Frank Mayer wrote:
The practical result of the 1986 Act was to change the method
of debt repayment. Municipal officials and stadium owners
structured their debt repayment so that revenue streams from
the actual stadium accounted for less than 10% of the total
repayment, while the public was responsible for the remaining
90%. This financing plan forced the federal government to
recognize a stadium construction project as a public facility and
consequently permit tax-exempt bond financing. In order to
reach the 90% public funding level, municipal governments
have employed techniques including increasing the sales tax,
tourist tax, sin taxes, and implementing a tax on lottery
proceeds. 2 9
The more popular approach, at least concerning hotels and
convention centers, involves management agreements between a
private entity and a municipality arranging for the private business to
run the facility. This practice accelerated after 1997 when the
permissible length of these management contracts was extended from
five to fifteen years, initiating a "boom in publicly financed hotels.""13
In order to develop a baseline against which to compare tribal
tax-exempt bonding authority, the Senate Finance Committee
recently commissioned a study by the Government Accountability
Office ("GAO") to determine the scope of projects financed by state
private business use. The private security or payment test is met if the payment of
the principal of, or the interest on, more than 10 percent of the proceeds of an
issue is directly or indirectly (1) secured by an interest in property used or to be
used for a private business use, (2) secured by an interest in payments in respect of
such property, or (3) to be derived from payments, whether or not to the issuer, in
respect of property, or borrowed money, used or to be used for a private business
use.
Rev. Rul. 2003-116, 2003-2 C.B. 1083, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-drop/
rr-03-116.pdf. Section 141(e) provides, in part, that the term "qualified bond" includes
any private activity bond that (1) is a qualified 501(c)(3) bond; (2) meets the applicable
requirements of § 146; and (3) meets the applicable requirements of each subsection of
§ 147. While § 103(a) of the 1986 Tax Code exempts from gross income interest on state
and local bonds, such exemption is not extended to private activity bonds that are not also
qualified bonds. 26 U.S.C. §§ 103(b)(1), 141 (2000).
129. Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and
Where We Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 195, 210-11 (2005) (citations omitted).
130. Mary Wisniewski, Cities Play Hotel Game: Face Choices on Independence, Risk,
BOND BUYER, Aug. 30, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WLNR 840332.
20071 1035
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and local governments in eight particular categories. 31 The results of
the study are summarized as follows:
* Rental housing. From 2000 through 2004, municipalities
borrowed $46.4 billion in 3,557 tax-exempt bond issues for
multifamily housing projects. These types of housing
projects are likely to involve rental-housing units for low-
income households.
* Road transportation. From 2000 through 2004,
municipalities borrowed $61.4 billion in 1,094 tax-exempt
issues for toll roads and highways.
* Parking facilities. From 2000 through 2004, municipalities
borrowed $3.5 billion in 220 tax-exempt issues for parking
facilities.
* Park and recreation facilities. From 2000 through 2004,
municipalities borrowed $60.9 billion in 3,085 tax-exempt
issues to build public facilities. This general category
includes several recreation-related facilities, including
libraries and museums ($7.5 billion in 470 issues);
convention centers ($11.1 billion in 236 issues); theaters
($0.6 billion in twenty-nine issues); parks, zoos, and
beaches ($6.1 billion in 723 issues); stadiums and arenas
($5.3 billion in 119 issues); and other recreation facilities
($4.6 billion in 420 issues).
* Golf facilities. In 2005 there were about 2,400 municipal
golf courses in the United States, with such courses existing
in all states. Tax-exempt bonds have financed or partially
financed at least 120 golf courses in twenty-nine states.
About 5% of municipal golf courses connect to resorts or
real estate developments. Over the past ten years an
increasing number of golf courses have been built as part
of larger real estate developments. Some municipalities
have issued tax-exempt revenue bonds for the construction
of resorts with golf courses, lodging, and meeting facilities.
* Convention centers. The report noted over 300
government-owned convention centers. In addition, from
2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed $11.1 billion in
236 tax-exempt issues related to convention centers.
* Hotels. From one set of sources, the GAO identified
thirty-nine hotel projects associated with convention
131. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 50, at 4-5 (2006).
[Vol. 851036
TRIBAL BONDS
centers or airports that were financed by tax-exempt
bonds. Selected government financial reports that the
GAO examined disclosed an additional twelve hotel
projects that were financed with tax-exempt bonds in
recent years.
* Gaming-support facilities. All but two states have some
form of legal gaming. Forty-one states and the District of
Columbia reported assets and revenues related to lotteries.
Their annual operating income ranged from $2 million to
$2 billion. According to selected government financial
reports, tax-exempt financing has been used for capital
projects to benefit gaming operations in several states.
This report was commissioned, in part, because the restrictions
on tribal tax-exempt bonding have been "difficult to enforce by the
[IRS and have] increased the tax compliance burden on Indian tribal
governments." '132 Part IV contains a detailed discussion of projects
that state and local governments have financed with tax-exempt
bonds, but which would have to be financed with more expensive
taxable debt if undertaken by tribal governments. First, however, an
examination of the legislative history of the Tribal Tax Status Act is
necessary in order to identify the origins of the inequities at issue.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY MANEUVERING OVER
TRIBAL TAX STATUS
A. The Tax Status of Indian Tribes Before the 1982 Tribal Tax Status
Act
The Tribal Tax Status Act was the culmination of a huge effort
by tribes and their advocates on Capitol Hill to achieve a measure of
equality with states in the Tax Code. 33 Before its passage, and
"despite the fact that the federal government has expressly
recognized tribal governments as sovereign governmental entities for
more than 150 years, with responsibilities to constituents equal to that
of state and local governments, Indian tribes ... have occupied an
anomalous niche within the structure of federal tax laws., 134 Prior to
1982, IRS Revenue Rulings rather than statutes governed the
132. Id. at 1.
133. See generally Williams, supra note 30 (detailing testimony by Indians and
comments by various members of Congress in considering the 1982 Act).
134. Id. at 358.
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taxation of tribes.'35 Under Revenue Ruling 67-284, the IRS reasoned
that because tribes occupy a space in government roughly analogous
to states, income of a tribal government, like that going to a state, is
exempt from federal taxation.136 The IRS failed to pursue the same
logic, however, when it denied tribes the ability to issue tax-free debt.
Revenue Ruling 68-231 erroneously reasoned that since the powers of
a tribe are delegated to it by the federal government rather than a
state (in that case, Washington), it cannot be considered a "state" for
purposes of § 103's exemption from federal taxation for interest paid
on state and municipal debt. 37 Lingering uncertainty because of
inconsistencies in how the IRS made its rulings on the tax status of
tribes led Congress to take up consideration of a comprehensive
Indian tax law.
The 1982 Act was not the first serious attempt at comprehensive
Indian tax legislation, as a bill that would have granted tribes a similar
tax status to states was introduced in 1975.138 This legislation
proposed equal treatment in the areas of federal excise taxes,
charitable donation deductions, and deductibility of property taxes.
An important provision would have authorized tribes to issue tax-
exempt bonds on nearly the same grounds as states under § 103.13
The House Ways and Means Committee reported H.R. 8989
favorably,1" but the legislation was not considered by the full
House.' Congress took no further action until its consideration of a
135. See Aprill, supra note 30, at 335.
136. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55. Williams notes that the IRS made this ruling
despite the absence of any express Congressional authority for such an exemption, a true
anomaly in tax law. Williams, supra note 30, at 359 n.113. This ruling, then, indicates the
strength of the premise that Indian tribes are in fact political entities within the United
States with duties and obligations owed to their constituents.
137. Rev. Rul. 68-231, 1968-1 C.B. 48. As Williams notes, critics have argued that the
IRS has adopted inconsistent positions in these two revenue rulings. Williams, supra note
30, at 360 n.116. Other revenue rulings also failed to provide equal treatment for tribes, in
denying a tax deduction for a charitable donation to the Zuni Pueblo under 26 U.S.C.
§ 2055, see Rev. Rul. 74-179, 1974-1 C.B. 279, and denying an exemption from federal
excise taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 4224 for the sale of an automobile to an Indian Tribe, see
Rev. Rul. 58-610, 1958-2 C.B. 815.
138. H.R. 8989, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975).
139. The 1975 Legislation would have assured "nearly" identical bonding authority for
tribes as compared to states, but not "completely" identical authority because it is clear
that tribes would have had a more limited ability to issue tax exempt bonds for
commercial or industrial activity. Aprill, supra note 30, at 343. This legislation also would
have limited the issuance of tax-free debt to support governmental functions. See id.
140. H.R. REP. No. 94-1693, at 1 (1976).
141. See Aprill, supra note 30, at 344; Williams, supra note 30, at 364-65.
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Senate bill'42 that would eventually become the 1982 Tribal Tax
Status Act.'43
B. The Passage of the 1982 Tribal Tax Status Act
Senate Bill 1298 was introduced by five senators' 44 to equalize
the treatment of states and tribes in a number of areas of the Tax
Code, including tax-free bonding authority. Senate Bill 1298 would
have enabled tribes to issue tax-exempt debt obligations to finance
their governmental activities under § 103 of the Internal Revenue
Code.145 Tribes would have achieved equal treatment with states by
virtue of the legislation's reference to § 103, which defines states' tax-
free bonding authority. At the time this authority proposed in the
Senate bill was quite broad and included the authority to issue
controversial industrial development bonds for a variety of projects
so long as the trade or business financed by the issuance occurred on
the tribe's reservation. 46 The Senate Finance Committee reported
the bill favorably and recommended passage. 47  The Senate
incorporated this bill into House Bill 5470, the Periodic Payments
Settlement Act, which the House passed without the tribal tax
legislation piece. 148  Representative Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.), in
particular, objected to the tribal tax provisions, a setback which sent
the bill to a conference committee with Representative Gibbons a
conferee. 49
While the stated purpose of the introduced legislation was to
eliminate the perception of differences between tribal governments
and state or local governments, 5 ° the ultimate legislation that
emerged from the House-Senate Conference Committee emphasized
rather than eliminated those differences. The rest of this section
details those fundamental changes in the legislation.
The first major change in the legislation was to specifically
prevent tribes from issuing any tax-free private activity bonds. Tribes
142. Aprill, supra note 30, at 344.
143. S. 1298, 97th Cong. (1982).
144. The bill was sponsored by Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), Mark
0. Hatfield (R-Ore.), Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), and Max Baucus (D-Mont.). See S. 1298,
97th Cong. (1982).
145. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 30, at 363.
146. S. 1298, 97th Cong. (1982); Williams, supra note 30, at 363.
147. S. REP. No. 97-646, at 8-17 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580, 4580.
148. See id.
149. Many of Representative Gibbons' actions are analyzed in Part V.
150. S. 1298, 97th Cong. (1982) (stating in preamble that the legislation would treat
Indian tribal governments "the same as or similar to States").
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retained the ability to issue general obligation bonds, traditionally
used for funding ventures such as school construction.1 5' Tribal
governments, however, "lack[ed] a diversified economy as well as the
broad, stable tax base" necessary to issue general obligation bonds.'52
Thus, tribes were "given bonding authority they were unable to use
and denied bonding authority they would have welcomed." '53 Prior
to the emergence of the conference bill, "every version of the Tribal
Tax Status Act had included specific authority for tribes to engage in
at least some limited form of tax-exempt [private activity bond]
financing." In fact, no "witness or member of the Senate or House, in
printed hearings, committee reports, or debate, ever voiced [an]
objection" to allowing tribes to enjoy the same status as state and
local governments relative to private activity bonds. Moreover, the
Treasury Department had specifically endorsed all of the earlier
versions of the Tribal Tax Status Act, including the provisions Indian
tribes used to issue tax-exempt private activity bonds, stating "that
tribal governments should be treated for Federal tax purposes in the
same manner as State and local governments." '54 Treasury supported
this legislation, despite its broader efforts to generally curtail and
limit tax-exempt private activity bonds,'5 5 arguing that entities that
"are similarly situated should be treated alike for tax purposes if the
law is to be applied fairly and equitably." '156 Given the limited tribal
tax base available for general obligation bonds,157 the ability to issue
revenue bonds was one of the most important provisions sought by
tribal governments.
The Conference Committee Report, however, stated quite
clearly that "tribal governments are only permitted to issue private
activity bonds ([such as] industrial development bonds [or] mortgage
subsidy bonds), ' 58 thus ensuring that tribal bonds could not be used
for economic development projects that might generate profits for
private actors.
151. Aprill, supra note 30, at 348.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See 1981-82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 1298, S. 2197, and S.
2498 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the S. Comm. on Fin.,
97th Cong. 57 (1982) (statement of William McKee, Tax Legislative Counsel, Department
of the Treasury) [hereinafter McKee Statement].
155. Williams, supra note 30, at 368 n.149.
156. McKee Statement, supra note 154, at 58.
' 157. See supra Part III.A.
158. H.R. REP. No. 97-984, at 16-17 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4598,
4602.
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If the elimination of any chance of private activity bonds issuance
was not bad enough, the Conference Committee Report also added
the additional requirement on tribes' authority to issue tax-free debt.
This provision authorized tribes to issue tax-exempt bonds "only if
such obligation is part of an issue substantially all of the proceeds of
which are to be used in the exercise of any essential governmental
function." '159 The essential governmental function language may seem
innocuous enough, since § 103 grants states tax-free bond authority as
a tool with which to perform their general governmental functions."
The "essential governmental function" element of the legislation,
however, was unmistakably an "additional requirement"'61 that was
not imposed on states. Thus, by virtue of the 1982 Tribal Tax Status
Act, Indian tribes receive tax-free treatment of their debt obligations
under a narrower set of projects than states. The open question after
passage of the 1982 Act was, what was an "essential governmental
function?"
C. Initial Implementation of the 1982 Tribal Tax Status Act
The Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1982 Act
offered little explanation of the essential governmental function
requirement but did indicate that tribes were granted tax-free bond
authority to undertake only a core set of government projects, and
that Congress was primarily concerned with preventing private actors
from benefiting from the tax subsidy. Because the essential
governmental function test also circumscribes tribes' general ability to
issue tax-free debt obligations under § 103; however, the issue
becomes whether tribes themselves (where no private entity benefits)
can engage in a broad range of activities-such as construction of
hotel resorts and public-use golf courses-that are not necessarily
within a set of core government-provided services.
In the wake of the passage of the 1982 Act, the IRS was charged
with determining the scope of tribes' tax-free bonding authority. As
Professor Ellen Aprill points out, however, defining the term
"essential governmental function" is no easy task.162 Several Supreme
Court cases illustrate the ambiguity of this term and its ultimate
159. Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 202, 96
Stat. 2607, 2609 (1983) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000)).
160. See supra Part I.
161. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c) (2000) (listing additional requirements for tax exempt bonds).
162. See Aprill, supra note 30, at 348-49.
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"unworkability."' 63  Early cases upheld federal taxation of income
paid to the trustees of the Boston Elevated Railway Company
because operating a street railway was proprietary rather than
governmental, 64 yet struck down a tax imposed on the salary of a
New York water system engineer because operating a water system
had developed into a governmental function.1 65 Later cases effectively
eliminated the term from Congress's arsenal by declaring (1) that
"what might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or
even dangerous extension of state activities may today be deemed
indispensable, 166 and (2) that the distinction had become "too
entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal criterion.'
' 67
To address this issue, tribes obtained legal representation to
advise the Treasury Department that the essential governmental
function requirement should be construed broadly in light of the
overriding purpose of the 1982 Tribal Tax Act to "provide relief to
Indians."'" The strategy worked, and Indians were given tax-free
bond authority under the regulations169 not only for any activity that
would be exempt if undertaken by a state or local government but
also for any activity for which Indian tribes receive funding from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs under either the Snyder Act 7 ' or the Indian
163. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543 (1985) (holding
that the distinction between essential and nonessential governmental functions is
unworkable and that such a distinction cannot be given any "principled content").
164. See Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 227 (1934).
165. See Brush v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 352, 370-71 (1937). This case emphasizes that the
notion of what is an essential governmental function is not a fixed set of public projects.
Indeed, just as the Supreme Court recognized that many projects can become more
"essential" to governments over time, some governments may deem certain projects more
essential than other governments. This notion is particularly true in the case of Indian
tribes, many of which are located in areas that simply do not enjoy the benefits of a vibrant
and diverse private sector. Thus, while for most citizens of this country, their
entertainment is provided by the private sector, for many Indians, their only option is to
turn to the tribal government for entertainment outlets. Arguably, tribes should be
granted a freer hand in the use of tax-free debt obligations because of the lack of private
sector services; instead, as this Article demonstrates, they now have one hand tied behind
their backs in utilizing tax-free debt.
166. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980) (citing New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 591 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543.
167. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion).
168. Aprill, supra note 30, at 351 (citing Letter & Memorandum from Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Kampelman to Hugo Santora, Legislative Analysis Officer, Internal
Revenue Serv. (June 28, 1983)).
169. 26 C.F.R. § 305-7871-1 (2006).
170. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2000). This Act gives the Bureau of Indian Affairs broad authority
to "expend such moneys as Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit,
care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States" for a broad set of
purposes. Id.
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Self-Determination Act. 17' Because both acts fund a broad range of
activities, tribal bond authority was also relatively broad. For
instance, tribes could issue tax-free debt obligations to finance
"[g]eneral support" activities and "industrial assistance and
advancement." 173
Despite the broad language, tribes issued very few bonds under
the 1982 Act and the arguably generous (for tribes) regulations, as
only seven tribal issuances had occurred by the time Congress
revisited the legislation in January of 1988.171 Of these projects, only
one was a traditional governmental function on the reservation; six
were "off-reservation leveraged buy-outs. ' ' 175 For example, one of the
reported issuances helped the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community in Arizona purchase a cement factory to be used
primarily as an income-generating investment to help pay for other
tribal services.176
Despite the small number of reported transactions, this relatively
broad bonding authority turned out to be short-lived as both the
language of the statute and the IRS's approach to enforcing it would
soon become even more restrictive.
D. Congress Closes the Door: The 1987 Amendments to the Tribal
Tax Status Act
Five years after the 1982 Act, Representative Gibbons sponsored
a measure in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987177 to
restrict the use of tribal bonds by clarifying the essential
governmental function requirement. 178  The House Committee
Report explained that in light of "recent reports of Indian tribal
governments issuing tax-exempt bonds for what are substantively
interests in commercial and industrial enterprises," the "committee
believes ... [that] it is appropriate to reiterate the scope of bond
171. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (2000).
172. See Aprill, supra note 30, at 351.
173. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 13).
174. See Aprill, supra note 30, at 357.
175. Id. at 358. A "leveraged buy-out" is a purchase of a company by investors who
borrow a substantial portion of the purchase price. This arrangement is useful to tribes
who often do not have the tax base to support large issuances of general obligation bonds.
Id. at 348.
176. Joan Pryde, Two Bond Issues Sold by Tribes May Face Review by Congress,
BOND BUYER, June 9, 1987, at 1, available at 1987 WLNR 279497.
177. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10632(a), 101
Stat. 1330-1, 1330-455 (1987) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 7871(e) (2000)).
178. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1139 (1987), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1,
2313-748.
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authority granted to Indian tribal governments." '179 The clarification
measure thus limited essential functions for purposes of tribal tax-free
bond authority to those functions that are "customarily performed by
State and local governments with general taxing powers. 180
In addition, on September 10, 1987, Gibbons wrote a letter to
Treasury Secretary James Baker imploring the Department to
investigate leveraged buy-outs by tribes.' He also noted that such
projects are a "far cry from schools, streets and sewers, "182 recalling
the one line of the 1982 legislative history explaining the essential
governmental function requirement. 83
Although it had passed the house, Gibbons's amendment was not
included in the Senate version of the 1987 Budget Act, as it was
opposed by many in the Senate as too draconian. Twenty-two
senators wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee to oppose the measure in conference.1" Their concern
was that the amendment would stifle tribes' efforts to "decrease tribal
unemployment, alleviate poverty, preserve natural or cultural
resources of the tribe or contribute to tribal economic activity.' ' 85 As
an alternative, this group proposed targeting potential abuses more
precisely by eliminating bonding authority for projects that produced
only passive income from investments in real estate or other off-
reservation ventures.186 This less restrictive alternative would have
allowed tribes to utilize tax-free debt obligations much in the same
manner as states. Unfortunately, as in 1982, Representative Gibbons
again secured an appointment to the Conference Committee and
179. Id. One of the reports of commercial-based Indian bond activity was a clearly
anti-Indian article appearing in Forbes magazine entitled "Smoke Signals." Matthew
Schifrin, Smoke Signals, FORBES, June 15, 1987, at 42. The Schifrin article incorrectly
describes tribal bond authority as exempt from "the sharp restrictions placed by last year's
tax reform act on the volumes of underwriting that municipal bodies around the country
can engage in." Id. The characterization is false because the volume limitations applied to
private activity bonds, an authority specifically denied to tribes by the 1982 Act. See
Aprill, supra note 30, at 359 (discussing the inaccuracy of the Forbes article). Despite its
inaccuracies, the Forbes article appears to have "sounded an alarm for Congress," and
Gibbons in particular, that clarifying legislation was needed to shut down tribal bond
activity. Id. at 360.
180. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 10632(a) (emphasis added).
181. Aprill, supra note 30, at 361.
182. Id.
183. H.R. REP. No. 97-984, at 16-17 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4598, 4602.
184. John J. Doran, 22 Senators Urge Bentsen To Oppose Legislation To Curb Indian
Bond Power, BOND BUYER, Dec. 14, 1987, at 6, available at 1987 WLNR 280533.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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pushed through his stifling amendment with only one relatively
insignificant carve-out for tribes.'87
While Aprill describes the amendment as a "measure to tighten
the tribal bond measures by limiting essential governmental functions
to those customarily financed with exempt bonds by state and local
governments,"'" the specific statutory language had the potential for
a much more restrictive interpretation: limiting tribal tax-exempt
bond authority to those projects typically financed with general tax
revenue, a narrower set of projects than those typically financed
through tax-free debt obligations.'89
E. The IRS Nails the Door Shut. Aggressive Enforcement of the
Essential Governmental Function Requirement
In the wake of the 1987 amendment, one issue facing tribes
seeking to utilize tax-free debt obligations is that Congress has
provided little guidance, other than the limiting language in the 1987
Conference Report, as to what is and what is not an essential
governmental function customarily performed by states.190 As noted
above, the uncertainty engendered by these terms provides little
guidance for Indian tribes 9' and much leeway for the IRS. As it turns
out, the IRS has taken its cue from Representative Gibbons and has
187. Id.; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10632(b),
101 Stat. 1330-1, 1330-455 to -457 (1987) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7871(e) (2000)). Tribes
were permitted to issue industrial development bonds if the proceeds were used for
tribally owned manufacturing facilities on tribal lands that employed tribal members. 26
U.S.C. § 7871(c)(3)(B) (2000). Aprill notes that the employment restriction is
"particularly onerous." Aprill, supra note 30, at 362 n.175. The requirement is that the
aggregate amount of bonds outstanding at the end of each year may not exceed twenty
times the wages paid to tribal members. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c)(3)(D). Thus, if a tribe issues
$200 million in debt, it must pay tribal members $10 million that year, effectively reducing
the amount available for investment.
188. Aprill, supra note 30, at 361.
189. Indeed, as discussed infra, this distinction will surface in an IRS field service audit,
much to the detriment of tribes.
190. A recent letter sent by Eric Solomon, the Treasury Department's acting deputy
assistant secretary for tax policy, seems to have only added to the uncertainty. See Alison
L. McConnell, Enforcement: Treasury Letter Leaves Lawyers Debating Tribal Bonds
Issue, BOND BUYER, Jan. 19, 2006, at 5, available at 2006 WLNR 1380557. While some
have interpreted the letter as validating the IRS's current enforcement stance, others
argued that "Solomon's juxtaposition of 'essential governmental function' with
'customary' activities of state and local governments ... sustained tribes' arguments for
financing commercial facilities with tax-exempt bonds." Id.
191. One author has noted the possibility that "tribes could be penalized for not
complying with a dodgy definition." Rebecca L. Adamson, The Taxman Cometh, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 15, 2003, at A5 available at http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfm?id=1042547292.
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recently decided to aggressively enforce an extremely narrow
interpretation of the essential governmental function requirement.
In a March 2005 Bond Buyer article, Charles Anderson, field
operations manager for the IRS tax-exempt bond office, stated that
the IRS intended to conduct "a dozen or more examinations of tribal
bond issues within the next year or so."'" In September 2005,
Anderson stated that the IRS has challenged twelve tribal tax-exempt
bonds, six tribal conduit bonds, and six direct tribal issues.'93 Christie
Jacobs of the Office of Indian Tribal Governments at the IRS stated
during February 2006 that eight to ten tribal tax-exempt issues were
currently under audit. 94 Dale White, then general counsel for the
Mohegan Tribe, stated to the author in April of 2006 that the IRS had
audited or was auditing at least half of the tribe's bonds. In a January
12, 2006, memorandum, several Dorsey & Whitney tax attorneys
expressed the following opinion regarding the IRS's enforcement
practices:
We believe that, if the Service were forced to defend its
positions before a court, the tribes should prevail on both of
these issues [direct tribal issues and conduit issues]. Our
concern is that, by initiating numerous audits against individual
tribal issuers, the Service is (a) taking on the tribes one by one,
(b) without the tribes being able to coordinate their analysis,
research and arguments, (c) in a situation where it is very
difficult to get the issues before a court for review. 195
Professionals in the field of tribal debt issuances generally
believe that the percentage of tribal bonds audited is substantially
greater than the percentage of non-tribal bonds audited, 96 and
empirical evidence supports such a conclusion.
192. Emily Newman, IRS Looking for Evidence of Arbitrage Abuse, BOND BUYER,
Mar. 16, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 4432390.
193. See Alison L. McConnell, IRS's Anderson Says Attorneys at Fault for Tribal Bond
Confusion, BOND BUYER, Sept. 22,2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 15305410.
194. Telephone Interview with Christie Jacobs, Dir., Indian Tribunal Gov't Office,
Internal Revenue Serv. (Feb. 14, 2006).
195. Memorandum from Mark A. Jarboe et al., Dorsey & Whitney, to Tribal Clients
(Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
196. Having been a featured speaker at numerous tribal finance conferences, the
author has had numerous conversations with a majority of the finance and legal
professionals who have experience with tax-exempt bonds in Indian Country.
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For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and local governments
issued an average of 14,038 tax-exempt bonds.'97 Over the same
period, tribal governments annually issued an average of five tax-
exempt bonds. 98 For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, the Tax Exempt
Bonds Office closed an average of 363 audits each year.' 99 Although
an exam typically takes two years to complete,20 0 assuming a constant
rate of audit activity, the IRS audits approximately 2.59% of all state
and local tax-exempt borrowings. Based on a survey of bond
lawyers 20 approximately 20% of all borrowings are issued under
bond indentures and held by the capital markets. Thus, the
approximate lifetime audit hazard rate for non-tribal municipal bonds
issued under bond indentures is approximately 0.5%.
To empirically determine the audit hazard rate for tribal bonds,
in April 2006, the author and his tribal finance research team from
the University of Michigan met with officials and analysts from the
tax-exempt bond division of the IRS to discuss the issue of tribal tax-
exempt bonds and develop a research plan to examine whether tribal
governments were subject to a disproportionate audit rate for their
bonds. For this work, the IRS suggested examining a particular form
that is filed by all governments, including tribal governments,
whenever they issue a tax-exempt debt obligation of any kind. When
governments enter into debt obligations, if the interest paid to the
197. See Letter from Lisett Rodriguez, Thomson Fin., to Gavin Clarkson, Assistant
Professor, Univ. of Mich. Sch. of Info. (May 12, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter Thomson Financial Data Extract].
198. Id.
199. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
STATISTICAL PORTRAYAL OF THE TAX EXEMPT BONDS OFFICE'S ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES FROM FISCAL YEAR 2002 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 5 (2005),
available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2005reports/200510186fr.pdf.
200. The length of a bond audit is variable, and recent reports detail means to shorten
the audit cycle. See ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT & GOV'T ENTITIES, AUDIT
CYCLE TIME AND COMMUNICATIONS: EMPLOYEE PLANS AND TAX EXEMPT BONDS, at
IV-23 to -24 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/act-rpt3-part4.pdf. For
the purposes of this Article, two years is believed to be representative of the average cycle
time. Even if the average cycle time is more or less than two years, the underlying point of
disparate treatment between state and local and tribal tax-exempt issuances remains true.
201. The author conducted a brief survey of members of the National Association of
Bond Lawyers, both prior to and during their annual convention in 2006. Only two
questions were posed to the respondents: (1) what percentage of municipal bonds
requiring an IRS form 8038G filing are issued under a bond indenture, and (2) what
percentage of tribal tax-exempt bonds requiring an IRS form 8038G filing are issued
under a bond indenture. The sample was weighted heavily towards those with experience
issuing bonds for Indian tribes, but all of the respondents indicated that the bulk of their
practice was still in non-tribal municipal bond work. This sample did, however, provide
the opportunity for direct comparison between tribal and non-tribal bond activities.
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lender is tax-exempt, then a form 8038 needs to be filed with the IRS.
If the obligation is for an amount greater than $100,000, then a form
8038G is filed; otherwise a form 8038GC is filed.
In collaboration with the University of Michigan researchers,
IRS analysts determined that eighty-eight tribes had filed one or
more such informational returns between January 1, 2002, and
December 31, 2005 (note that this data reflects direct tribal issues
only; conduit issues are not included in these figures):
Form 8038G 136
Form 8038GC 169
On either form, line 20 allows the tribe to check a box to indicate
whether the obligation is a lease or installment purchase. The data
was then broken down into the following:
Form 8038GC Form 8038G
Leases or Installment Sales 105 46
Bank Loans or Bond Indentures 64 90
The following was also determined, however, in the course of the
research:
* While some tribal debt examinations were initiated from
referrals, the majority of tribal debt examination cases
were initiated by the IRS through its normal case selection
process.
* The total dollar amount of debt issued during this time
period is around $700,000,000.
Although a greater level of detail would of course be desirable,
the IRS is limited in its ability to disclose based on rather strict
confidentiality requirements. Thus, the remaining data analysis and
conclusions in this section do not necessarily reflect the views of the
IRS.
The preliminary survey of bond lawyers2 °" indicates that for
every bond indenture requiring an 8038G filing, four to five bank
loans are also closed that require an 8038G filing. Thus, for the
ninety form 8038G filings from 2002 through 2005, assuming that 20%
202. See id.
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were for bond indentures, tribes issued eighteen bonds under bond
indentures, or an average of 4.5 per year. Municipal bonds of less
than $100,000 would never be issued under bond indentures,203 so the
8038GC filings have been excluded. If those are not excluded, the
average number of bonds is six per year; however, data from
Thomson Financial on tribal bonds issued between 2002 and 2005
indicates that there were twenty bonds issued.
Based on information from tribes and tribal bond attorneys for
tribes currently being audited, all of the audits for debt obligations
issued between 2002 and 2005 were for bond indentures; none was for
bank debt.
Using the IRS data, the three audits for bond indentures issued
between 2002 and 2005 represent 16.6% of all tribal bond indentures
issued during that same period, more than thirty-three times the 0.5%
hazard rate for state and local bonds during the same period.2 4 Using
the Thomson data generates a tribal hazard rate of 15%, or thirty
times the 0.5% hazard rate for state and local governments. In either
case, the audit hazard rate for tribal bonds in only their first four
years after issuance is substantially more than an order of magnitude
greater than the lifetime hazard rate for state and local government
bonds.
The instances of tribal audits appear even more disturbing when
one considers the fact that tribal tax-exempt issues make up only
0.1% of the tax-exempt bond market.25 For the years 2002 to 2004,
state and local governments issued on average $363.6 billion of tax-
203. The transaction costs and legal fees would likely be more than the bond, and such
a small amount would be insufficient to create an active market for the bond.
204. This disparity can be measured even more precisely if the IRS can determine the
total number of 8038G and GC forms that were filed between 2002 and 2005. Such a
number would provide the total number of bonds, which could be compared with the
Thomson Financial Data Extract, supra note 197, for capital market bond indentures.
205. The IRS has recently reported that a further examination of the data provided to
the Michigan tribal finance research team indicates that 12% of the outstanding tribal debt
was under examination. See Facsimile from Clifford Gannett, Dir. of Tax Exempt Bonds,
to Gavin Clarkson, Assistant Professor, Univ. of Mich. Sch. of Info. (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Note'that the IRS's 12% audit rate is based on dollar amounts
outstanding and not on the number of bonds issued under bond indentures that are being
audited. Furthermore, on a panel at a February 2007 tribal finance conference
(moderated by the author), IRS tax exempt bond director Clifford Gannett admitted that
the audit rate was "quite high." Cliff Gannett, Dir. of Tax Exempt Bonds, Internal Rev.
Serv., Remarks at the Sixth Semiannual Native American Finance Conference, IRS
Update: The Impact on Indian Country (Feb. 21, 2007).
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exempt debt"6 while tribal governments issued on average only $202
million of tax-exempt debt.2 7 The focus of significant IRS resources
on issuances making up merely 0.1% of the total market by itself
raises a presumption of improper IRS practices toward tribes.
One example of adverse treatment of a tribe is the case of the
Las Vegas Paiute Tribe. This particular tribe was never going to be a
major competitor in the gaming market, but they did have sufficient
land to develop a golf course thirty miles north of the Las Vegas
Strip. The Paiutes used proceeds from a tax-free bond issuance to
finance construction of a public golf course with a clubhouse, a retail
store that sells golf-related items, and a restaurant, all of which were
open to the public .2°  The tribe had good reason to believe that
construction of a public golf course would qualify as an essential
governmental function "customarily performed by State and local
governments, ' '2°1 given that "as of 1998 there were 2,645 publicly
owned, municipal golf courses in the United States., 210
In August of 2002, however, the IRS advised the Las Vegas
Paiutes that construction of a public golf course is "other than an
essential governmental function within the meaning of section
7871(e)., 21  Although the IRS acknowledged that "it is likely that
construction and operation of golf courses are customary
governmental functions, ' 212 it nonetheless decided to deny the tax
exemption based on its reading of the essential government function
requirement added by the 1987 amendment.
206. Facsimile from Clifford Gannett, supra note 205. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, state
and local governments issued $355.5 billion, $379 billion, and $356.5 billion of tax-exempt
debt, respectively. Id.
207. Id. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued $194.4 million, $233.3
million, and $178.4 million of tax-exempt debt respectively. Id.
208. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 20,024,712, at 2 (Nov. 22, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter FSA]. The FSA was originally released with
significant portions redacted. The IRS later released a second version which indicated
that the chief counsel's office at the IRS had recommended against challenging the tax-
exempt state of the Paiute bonds. See Alison L. McConnell, Bond Lawyers: IRS Out of
Order on Tribal Financings, BOND BUYER, Nov. 3, 2005, at 5, available at 2005 WLNR
18127583. The IRS then reversed itself and re-redacted the official version. See Alison L.
McConnell, IRS Investigating Full Release of Tribal Deal FSA, BOND BUYER, Nov. 23,
2005, at 44, available at 2005 WLNR 19226583; Alison L. McConnell, Controversial
Paragraphs Removed from IRS Advisory Memo on Tribal Bonds, BOND BUYER, Nov. 30,
2005, at 64, available at 2005 WLNR 19625871. All references are made to the FSA with
the least amount of redaction, which is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
209. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(e) (2000).
210. FSA, supra note 208, at 2.
211. Id. at 1.
212. Id.
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The argument set forth by the IRS was that the golf course was
not "intended to meet the recreational needs of [the] Tribe., 213
Although the IRS considers other public golf courses essential
governmental functions, the service took the position that the Paiutes
could not utilize tax-free debt to construct golf courses and an
accompanying club house because, in its opinion, the courses were
not of the type that would be used by tribal golfers. The Field Service
Advice Memorandum ("FSA") admits that all publicly built and
operated golf courses "are developed to enhance the lifestyle of both
golfing and non-golfing citizens of the community and perhaps to
create jobs,' 214 and the IRS's own in-house counsel recommended not
litigating the bond exemption because it would "be difficult to argue
that Golf Course is so commercial in nature that state and local
governments would not own and operate similar enterprises. "215
Additionally, the FSA acknowledged that "some courts, including the
Tenth Circuit, have adopted the principle that federal statutes are to
be construed liberally in favor of Native Americans, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit. ' 216 In short, the IRS's position
was untenable based on existing public practices and judicial rulings,
but it denied the tax exemption anyway.
In a sharp contrast to its approach in the 2002 FSA to defining an
essential governmental function as excluding any commercial activity,
the IRS has reasoned elsewhere that a state investment fund for cash
balances constituted an essential governmental function because
it may be assumed that Congress did not desire in any way to
restrict a state's participation in enterprises that might be useful
in carrying out those projects desirable from the standpoint of
the state government which, on a broad consideration of the
question, may be the function of the sovereign to conduct. 2
17
Thus, for purposes of § 115 of the Tax Code, the IRS has, without
intervention by Congress, defined as an essential governmental
function any activity that makes or saves money for a non-tribal
government. This definition encompasses the very purpose of the Las
Vegas Paiute Golf Course, which the IRS has reasoned does not
qualify as an essential governmental function.1
213. Id. at 5.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 8.
217. See Rev. Rul. 77-261, 1977-2 C.B. 45.
218. FSA, supra note 208, at 5.
2007] 1051
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Las Vegas Paiute case is merely one example of differential
treatment of tribal governments by both the Tax Code and the IRS
enforcement regime.21 9
F. Is the IRS Blocking a Fire Escape? Uncertainty Regarding Tribal
Conduit Financing
Constricted by the essential governmental function requirement,
some tribes have chosen to finance projects such as hotels on a
taxable basis; however, a small handful of tribes have attempted to
overcome the "inequities in the tax code ' 220 by using an alternative
tax-exempt mechanism referred to as a conduit financing. In a
conduit financing the tax-exempt security is actually issued by a local
government agency (referred to as the conduit issuer) to finance a
project for a third party (referred to as the conduit borrower) in
situations when the conduit borrower cannot issue tax-exempt debt
on its own for the project. The security for this type of issue either is
the credit of the conduit borrower or pledged revenues from the
project itself rather than the credit of the conduit issuer. Such
securities are not general obligations of the conduit issuer because the
conduit borrower is liable for generating the pledged revenues. If the
conduit issuer is not subject to the "essential governmental function"
test,221 the conduit mechanism should enable a tribe to finance
projects with tax-exempt bonds that it might otherwise have to
finance on a taxable basis.222
Additionally, conduit financing is an established form of public
finance typically utilized by 501(c)(3) (nonprofit) organizations, such
as charity hospitals. Conduit financing has also won the endorsement
of the Tax Court. In Fairfax County Economic Development
Authority v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court held that the
development authority was the real issuer of industrial development
bonds used to build a facility, a portion of which would be leased to
the U.S. Government Printing Office.224 It reached this conclusion
despite the fact that the federal government was the obligor of the
bonds because the credit of the government as a lessor of the retail
219. See infra Part V.B.
220. Merrill Lynch Municipal Credit Research, supra note 48.
221. If the conduit issuer is not a tribal government, then the "essential governmental
function" test of § 7871 should not apply, since the test is only applied to the issuer of a
bond. Note that the test is never applied when neither conduit issuer nor conduit
borrower are tribal entities.
222. See HYATr ET AL., supra note 27, at 21.
223. 77 T.C. 546 (1981).
224. Id. at 546-49.
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space backed the bonds.2' The Tax Court reasoned that form
governs substance in § 103 cases and held that the development
authority be respected as the issuer of the bonds, even though the
federal government was the real obligor. 26
Despite the criticism of the IRS's aggressive approach in the 2002
FSA, however, the Service is taking an even more hostile
enforcement stance against conduit financing by tribes. The IRS has
now challenged every single tribal attempt to issue conduit bonds227
and has recently taken the position that "bonds issued by a state
entity where an Indian tribal government is a conduit borrower are
private-activity bonds, even if the proceeds are used for an essential
government function.2128  This most recent position apparently
contradicts an IRS position taken barely twelve months earlier that
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. A total of five tribal conduit bonds appear to have been issued: three by the
Seminole Tribe of Florida, see Alison L. McConnell, Seminole Tribe Receives Negative IRS
Rulings, BOND BUYER, Dec. 8, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 21588882 (discussing
IRS audits of $345 million of 2002 conduit bonds, $74 million of 2003 conduit bonds, and
$50 million of 2004 conduit bonds, each issued on behalf of the tribe by the Capital Trust
Agency), one by the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, see Susanna Duff Barnett,
$145.5M Cabazon Deal Under Scrutiny; IRS Steps Up Probes of Indian Tribes, BOND
BUYER, Aug. 6, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 1252400 (discussing IRS examination
of $145.5 million in tax-exempt bonds issued by the California Statewide Communities
Development Authority on behalf of Cabazon's East Valley Tourist Development
Authority), and one by the Santa Ana Pueblo, see Alison L. McConnell, N.M. County To
Redeem Tribal Bonds After IRS Memo Triggers Redemption, BOND BUYER, Nov. 28,
2005, at 44, available at 2005 WLNR 19438399 [hereinafter McConnell, N.M. County]. A
sixth bond issued by the Yakima Nation has been identified as a conduit by the Bond
Buyer, see Alison L. McConnell, Washington Tribe's $9.3M Sawmill Deal Taxable, IRS
Says, BOND BUYER, May 25, 2006, at 40, available at 2006 WLNR 9340795, but the bond
was a direct issue and not a conduit. So, when Charles Anderson, field operations
manager for the IRS tax-exempt bond office, stated that at least six tribal conduit bonds
are currently being challenged by the IRS, see Alison L. McConnell, IRS' Anderson Says
Attorneys at Fault for Tribal Bond Confusion, BOND BUYER, Sept. 22, 2005, at 1, available
at 2005 WLNR 15305410, he apparently overstated the number of conduit audits. He may
also have been thinking of the bonds issued by the Morongo Band of Mission Indians,
which were originally to be issued as conduit bonds but were subsequently issued as a mix
of tax-exempt and taxable bonds, see Rich Saskal, IRS Takes Closer Look at Calif. Tribal
Deal's Tax-Exempt Status, BOND BUYER, Aug. 30, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR
13911589 (discussing IRS examination of $51 million in tax-exempt bonds issued on behalf
of Morongo Band of Mission Indians in 2004 for water and waste water system
improvements). In any event, at least two senior officials at the IRS have confirmed that
the 100% audit rate for conduit bonds is correct.
228. See Alison L. McConnell, IRS: All Tribal Conduit Deals Are Private Activity,
BOND BUYER, Nov. 28, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 20922469 (quoting an as-yet
unpublished technical advice memorandum).
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stated that tax-exempt conduit bond proceeds could be used to
finance essential governmental functions.229
IV. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR EXPANDING TRIBAL TAX-
EXEMPT BONDING AUTHORITY
The economic arguments are straightforward. First, tax-exempt
bonds are being used for a whole host of commercial and economic
development activities that are providing benefit to non-tribal
governments, and Indian tribes should be able to take advantage of
those same opportunities. The economic need for expanded tribal
tax-exempt bonding authority is particularly acute given that upwards
of $50 billion in estimated annual capital needs go unmet in Indian
Country,23° in part because the debt service required to finance the
projects to meet those needs is too expensive at taxable rates.
Second, there is empirical evidence that the restrictions in § 7871 are
having a significant negative impact on the market for tribal tax-
exempt bonds. Finally, maintenance of these discriminatory
provisions in the Tax Code has a negative impact on federal revenues.
Conversely, expansion of tribal tax-exempt bonding authority would
produce a revenue-enhancing result.
A. Customary Use of Tax-Exempt Bonds by Non-Tribal
Governments for Commercial Activities
Although municipal bonds were traditionally issued to fund
infrastructure projects, today a significant number fund clearly
commercial activities, including economic development. Tourism, for
example, is a major economic force for many municipalities and is
vital to the economic prospects of several communities, and post-
Katrina New Orleans is almost wholly dependent on a rebound in
tourism for its long-term economic viability. Congress even passed
the Gulfcoast Opportunity Zone Act to allow private businesses in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama to issue tax-exempt private
activity bonds.2 31 Note, however, that while private businesses are
allowed to use tax-exempt "GO Zone" bonds to finance not only
229. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200,603,028, at 4 (Jan. 20, 2006), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0603028.pdf.
230. See HENSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 120.
231. Gulf Coast Opportunity Zone Act, Pub. L. No. 109-135, § 101(a), 119 Stat. 2577
(2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Louisiana businesses were
authorized to issue up to $7.9 billion in tax-exempt private activity bonds, while
Mississippi and Alabama businesses were authorized to issue $4.8 billion and $2.1 billion
respectively. Id. § 101(a), 119 Stat. 2581 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1400N(b)(4)).
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reconstruction projects but also projects that would normally be
considered private activity bonds, the legislation does not contain any
provision for tribes to finance reconstruction projects, let alone
private activity bonds, with such bonds, even though several tribes
were hit hard by either Katrina or Rita.
Tourism and tourism-related economic development can include
hotels, golf resorts, convention centers, and even racetracks and
casinos. In particular, the IRS has acknowledged that several
thousand municipal golf courses have been financed with tax-exempt
debt, 3 2 and non-tribal governments have issued billions of dollars in
tax-exempt bonds to finance hotels and convention centers.2 33 The
IRS has even issued recent rulings to permit tax-exempt financing for
new baseball stadiums for the New York Yankees and the New York
Mets, citing an earlier Revenue Ruling which held that the promotion
of tourism was an "exclusively public purpose.,,234  Nevertheless,
tourism and tourism-related economic development cannot be
financed by tribes with tax-exempt debt. Wholly apart from tourism,
there are thousands of other "commercial" projects that have been
financed by state and local governments with tax-exempt bonds, but
which tribes cannot similarly finance because of the § 7871
restrictions.
Hotel projects, involving tax-exempt issuances of hundreds of
millions of dollars, have commenced in a number of municipalities,
including the following:
* The Austin City Council approved the authorization of up
to $275 million of tax-exempt bonds to finance an 800-
room hotel near the city's newly expanded convention
center.235
* Baltimore issued $305 million to build a Hilton convention
hotel in downtown Baltimore. 36
232. See FSA, supra note 208, at 6.
233. See supra Part III.C.2.
234. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 20,064,001 (July 11, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 20,064,210
(July 19, 2006) (holding that "[mioney expended by a State in promoting tourism in the
State is for an exclusively public purpose" (quoting Rev. Rul. 72-194, 1972-1 C.B. 94)).
These rulings are wholly inconsistent with the position the IRS has been taking with
respect to the operation of tribal golf courses and hotels, which the IRS argues are not
essential governmental functions. See FSA, supra note 208, at 1.
235. Elizabeth Albanese, Austin City Council Approves Bond Authorization for Hotel
Financing, BOND BUYER, Mar. 14,2001, at 5, available at 2001 WLNR 858405.
236. Andrew Ackerman, Baltimore Convention Hotel Plan Gets Second Nod from City
Council, BOND BUYER, Aug. 17, 2005, at 5, available at 2005 WLNR 13268342.
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* The Chicago Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority
issued $133 million of tax-exempt hotel revenue bonds for
a Hyatt hotel.237
* The City of Omaha Convention Hotel Corporation sold
$103.5 million of tax-exempt bonds for a 450-room hotel to
be managed by Hilton.238
* The Denver Convention Center Hotel Authority issued
$349 million in revenue bonds to build a 1,100-room hotel
managed by the Hyatt Corporation.239
* The South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development
Authority issued $64.3 million in bonds to fund
construction of a 404-room hotel to be operated by
Radisson Hotels International.24
The Indianapolis Local Public Improvement Bond Bank
issued $18.2 million in tax-exempt bonds to help fund a
230-room luxury Hilton hotel.241
" Overland Park, Kansas, issued $87 million in bonds to
build a 412-room, full-service convention center hotel
operated under a fifteen-year contract by Sheraton
Operating Corporation.242
* The city of West Palm Beach, Florida, issued $55 million in
tax-exempt revenue bonds to finance infrastructure and a
parking garage for CityPlace, a $550 million mixed-used
development downtown.243
237. See Karen Pierog, Chicago Hotel Revenue To Back Exposition Authority Bond
Sale, BOND BUYER, Feb. 26, 1996, at 1, available at 1996 WLNR 752315.
238. See Elizabeth Carvlin, Deal in Focus: City-Backed Omaha Hotel Granted Rare
Insurance Coverage, BOND BUYER, Apr. 10, 2002, at 34, available at 2002 WLNR 1140306.
239. See Elizabeth Albanese, Deal in Focus: Denver Selling $349 Million for
Convention Center Hotel, BOND BUYER, June 17, 2003, at 27, available at 2003 WLNR
1719390.
240. See Christine Albano, Big Entrance: Hotel Deals Set Off Frenzied Buying, Earn
High Yields, BOND BUYER, June 6, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WLNR 855705.
241. See Elizabeth Carvlin, Indianapolis Bond Bank Plans $28M for Hotel, with Moral
Obligation, BOND BUYER, May 4,2004, at 4, available at 2004 WLNR 1264451.
242. Christine Albano, High Yield Focus: Kansas Hotel Deal's Revised Structure Eases
Buy-Side Concerns, BOND BUYER, Dec. 20, 2000, at 7, available at 2000 WLNR 852840.
243. Shelly Sigo, West Palm Beach, Fla., Still Has All-Stars in Its Eyes, BOND BUYER,
July 20, 2001, at 37, available at 2001 WLNR 856726.
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" The city of Staunton, Virginia issued $10 million in tax-
exempt bonds to renovate the Stonewall Jackson Hotel,
which contains 124 deluxe guest rooms.2"
* The District of Columbia Council approved a measure
authorizing the redevelopment of the Washington
Convention Center site, which could eventually lead to up
to $1.3 billion in tax-exempt bond issuances.245
Private activity bonds are still widely used as an important tool
for state and local economic development. 246  A similar practice
involves the issuance of tax-exempt bonds to build hotels in
economically depressed areas eligible by their empowerment zone
status. Such was the situation in the following instances:
* Little Rock, Arkansas, voters approved the issuance of $19
million in tax-exempt empowerment zone revenue bonds
to renovate the Little Rock Hilton.247
* San Antonio issued $130 million of tax-exempt
empowerment zone bonds to finance a new Hyatt
Corporation 1,000-room convention center hotel.248
* The St. Louis Industrial Development Authority issued
$98 million of tax-exempt federal empowerment zone
bonds to partially fund the construction of a convention
center hotel.249
Golf courses and resorts are another example of economic
activity funded by tax-exempt bonds.
In the late 1990s, the city of North Charleston, South
Carolina, issued $11.1 million in mortgage revenue bonds
to build a twenty-seven-hole municipal golf course. "In
2003 the city refunded the outstanding golf-related bonds
244. Matthew Vadum, VIRGINIA: Hotel Gets Facelift, BOND BUYER, Oct. 27, 2005,
at 35, available at 2005 WLNR 17725081.
245. Matthew Vadum, Old D.C. Convention Center Site Gets Go-Ahead for
Redevelopment, BOND BUYER, June 8, 2005, at 4, available at 2005 WLNR 9426916.
246. Aprill, supra note 30, at 342.
247. Elizabeth Albanese, Little Rock Voters Approve Hotel Bond Issue, BOND BUYER,
July 11, 2002, at 3, available at 2002 WLNR 1164284.
248. See Elizabeth Albanese, San Antonio Deal for Hyatt Hotel Empowered with Tax-
Exemption, BOND BUYER, Apr. 26, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 6861053.
249. Yvette Shields, St. Louis' Hotel Financing Deal Wins Investment-Grade Rating,
BOND BUYER, Nov. 15, 2000, at 3, available at 2000 WLNR 854355.
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by issuing $11.7 million in mortgage revenue bonds, for an
estimated $1.6 million in debt service savings."250
"[T]he Maryland Economic Development Corporation
(MEDCO) has issued about $176 million limited-
obligation revenue bonds to build two resorts that feature
a hotel, a conference center, and a golf facility. MEDCO
owns the Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay Conference
Center, with 400 hotel rooms, 35,000 square feet of
meeting and banquet space, an 18-hole championship golf
course and a 150-slip marina. 2 51
" The Maryland Board of Public Works, in 1996, approved
the sale of $26 million in tax-exempt revenue bonds as
partial funding for a golf resort in western Maryland.2
State officials indicated that the state-owned golf resort
would include a 220-room hotel and a public golf course,
designed by Jack Nicklaus, on the grounds of Rocky Gap
State Park "and is a long-planned economic development
project for Allegany County. '253
Tax-exempt bonds have not only been used to build hotels and
convention centers but also to finance casinos and horse tracks owned
by counties or municipalities, as well as other facilities related to
commercial gaming activities.
250. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 50, at 19. At the same
time the golf course bonds were issued, the city also issued $4.6 million in general
obligation bonds "to finance the construction of roads and infrastructure improvements in
the surrounding area . ... " In 2005, the municipal golf course had a $1 million operating
loss, but the city expects that the course's situation in the center of a residential and
commercial development eventually will contribute over $200 million in taxable property
value. Id.
251. Id. at 19. The study also noted that, according to municipal finance experts,
[s]tate and local governments can also provide indirect support to private golf
courses through lower taxable property values. Private golf courses may be
subject to agricultural assessment rules, which provide a tax break on property
taxes, given that golf courses also provide an open space. They also noted that
there may be other cases where land apportioned off by state and local
governments near residential property is transferred to private companies in order
to build golf courses.
Id.
252. Amy B. Resnick, Golf Resort Debt Proposal Passed by Maryland Works Board,
BOND BUYER, May 2, 1996, at 11, available at 1996 WLNR 759237; see also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 50, at 19 ("MEDCO also owns the Rocky Gap
Golf Course and Hotel/Meeting Center, with an 18-hole Jack Nicklaus signature golf
course, a 243-acre lake, and a resort lodge.").
253. Id.
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* In 1987, Polk County, Iowa, officials issued $40 million in
tax-exempt bonds to build the Prairie Meadows Racetrack
& Casino.254
* The racetrack at Retama Park near San Antonio was
financed with $75 million in tax-exempt debt.255 Retama
Development, the nonprofit organization set up by the city
of Selma, Texas, to construct and equip the racetrack,
subsequently issued $93.9 million in refunding bonds.256
* The Grand Prairie Sports Facilities Development
Corporation refinanced "one of the most successful horse
racing tracks in Texas" in part by issuing $15.2 million of
tax-exempt debt.257
* California's Del Mar Race Track Authority issued $50.7
million in tax-exempt bonds in 2005 to refund existing debt
and improve facilities at the San Diego County
Fairgrounds.258
The GAO Study notes that several "municipalities have provided
tax-exempt and taxable financing to build transportation
infrastructure in localities that depend on private gaming enterprises
to generate employment and gaming revenues to finance basic
government functions., 259 Examples include:
" New Jersey's Casino Reinvestment Development
Authority issued $93 million in tax-exempt hotel room fee
revenue bonds in 2004 "to finance Atlantic City casino
expansion projects and provide funds to the New Jersey
Sports and Exhibition Authority for horse racing purse
enhancements. ,260
* The Las Vegas monorail was financed with a combination
of tax-exempt and equity funds and provides seven
stations: MGM Grand, Bally's/Paris, Flamingo,
254. Tammy Williamson, Plans for Sale of Polk County, Iowa, Casino and Racetrack
Falls Through, BOND BUYER, June 25, 1998, at 38, available at 1998 WLNR 881131.
255. Janin Friend, Lone Star Racetrack Is Set To Issue Debt, but Some in Industry Say
Deal Is Risky, BOND BUYER, July 7, 1994, at 1, available at 1994 WLNR 656492.
256. Emily Newman, Tax Enforcement: IRS: Texas Development Corp.'s $171M of
Debt May Be Taxable, BOND BUYER, Jan. 12, 2005, at 5, available at 2005 WLNR 697822.
257. Darrell Preston, Deal in Focus: Texas Town Cleans Up at the Track with Recent
Refunding, BOND BUYER, Mar. 30, 1999, at 22, available at 1999 WLNR 892224.
258. See Jackie Cohen, CALIFORNIA: Mulling a Track Expansion, BOND BUYER,
July 21, 2006, at 35, available at 2006 WLNR 12991537.
259. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 50, at 22.
260. Id. at 23.
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Harrah's/Imperial Palace, Las Vegas Convention Center,
Las Vegas Hilton, and the Sahara. 6 t
Although it could not determine an exact number, the GAO
study also suggested that of the forty-one states that have ongoing
lottery operations, many have probably financed their facilities with
tax-exempt bonds.262
A number of states are also in the liquor business. Most states
have some level of involvement in liquor sales, distribution, or other
regulations,263 and in many states the only source for retail or
wholesale distribution of wine and distilled spirits is the state itself.
26
Many of the governmentally operated liquor stores in those
jurisdictions have been financed with tax-exempt debt.265  Under
existing IRS revenue rulings,26 stores operated by the state are
considered political subdivisions and not subject to income tax. As
such, under § 103 of the Tax Code, interest paid on bonds issued by
these entities is tax-exempt.267
In light of the expansive scope of commercial activities funded by
state and local governments using tax-exempt bonds, the Supreme
261. Id.
262. See id. at 22.
263. Jackie Cohen, Washington Liquor Control Board Tapping Market for $17M,
BOND BUYER, Oct. 11, 2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR 18070408.
264. RICHARD McGOWAN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ALCOHOL
INDUSTRY: THE SEARCH FOR REVENUE AND THE COMMON GOOD 52 (1997) (listing
Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming);
see also Lawrence Zelenak, The Puzzling Case of the Revenue Maximizing Lottery, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1, 10 nn.39-43 (2000).
265. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 263 (quoting bond analyst as saying that the state
agency " 'controls the licensing and distribution of liquor so that it's under state control
and it doesn't get out of hand. And P.S., they own a building-what's the cheapest way to
finance that?' "). The Cohen article also highlights a bond issued on behalf of the Utah
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, which "turned to the state's Building
Ownership Authority to issue $8.4 million of lease revenue bonds this past January. The
proceeds of the bond sale financed three renovations and building of state-operated liquor
stores located throughout Utah." Id. For numerous notices over the past decade of
Minnesota Municipal Liquor Revenue Bond sales, see Results of Negotiated Sales, BOND
BUYER, Nov. 8, 2006, at 22, available at 2006 WLNR 19776469; Results of Negotiated Sales,
BOND BUYER, May 1, 2002, at 22, available at LEXIS; Results of Negotiated Sales, BOND
BUYER, Nov. 24, 1999, at 20, available at 1999 WLNR 894788; Results of Negotiated Sales,
BOND BUYER, Aug. 31, 1999, at 15, available at 1999 WLNR 878182; Results of
Competitive Sales, BOND BUYER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 22, available at 1997 WLNR 839710.
266. See Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 29 (holding that income derived from the
operation of liquor stores by a state is not subject to federal income tax); Rev. Rul. 71-132,
1971-1 C.B. 29 (same).
267. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-27-072 (Apr. 12, 1993).
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Court's view of economic development as an essential governmental
function bears repeating:
Promoting economic development is a traditional and long
accepted governmental function, and there is no principled way
of distinguishing it from the other public purposes the Court
has recognized.268
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was not opining on an Indian
law case but was instead discussing economic development in the
municipal context.
B. The Restrictions on Tribal Tax-Exempt Bonding Authority Are
Significantly Damaging the Market for Tribal Bonds
Another argument for expanding tribal tax-exempt bonding
authority is that the current restrictions have a significant negative
impact on the market for tribal tax-exempt bonds. The deleterious
impact of these restrictions can be seen in the relative paucity of tribal
tax-exempt financings. For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and
local governments issued an average of 14,038 tax-exempt bonds.269
Over the same period, tribal governments annually issued an average
of five tax-exempt bonds.27° In dollar terms, for the years 2002 to
2004, state and local governments issued on average $363.6 billion of
268. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,470 (2005) (syllabus).
269. Thomson Financial Data Extract, supra note 197. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, state
and local governments issued 14,056, 14,752, and 13,306 tax-exempt short- and long-term
bonds, respectively. See id. (providing bond data and treating public universities and
public utilities as governmental instrumentalities); see also Bond Buyer Online Archives,
Annual Municipal Debt Sales, Long-Term Bonds, Number of Issues (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Bond Buyer Online Archives, Annual Municipal Debt
Sales, Short-Term Bonds, Number of Issues (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(stating that for 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and local governments issued 12,517, 13,251,
and 11,993 tax-exempt long-term bonds, respectively, and for 2002, 2003, and 2004, state
and local governments issued 3,435, 3,300, and 3,172 tax-exempt short-term bonds,
respectively).
270. See Thomson Financial Data Extract, supra note 197. For 2002, 2003, and 2004,
tribal governments issued four, six, and five tax-exempt short- and long-term bonds,
respectively. Id.; see also Bond Buyer Online Archives, Long-Term Bonds, supra note
269; Bond Buyer Online Archives, Short-Term Bonds, supra note 269. For the years 2002,
2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued six, nine, and five long-term bonds, respectively.
For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued zero, zero, and one short-
term bonds, respectively. (These Bond Buyer tribal bond statistics likely include some
taxable bonds, and therefore the Thomson figures provide a more accurate picture of
tribal tax-exempt debt issuances).
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tax-exempt debt27' while tribal governments issued on average only
$202 million of tax-exempt debt.272
Given the relative numbers of municipal and tribal issuers,273 the
expected number of tribal tax-exempt issues should be more than an
order of magnitude higher. American Indians account for more than
1.5% of the national population, yet tribes issue less than 0.1% of the
tax-exempt bonds each year.274
2002 2002 Par Amount 2003 2003 Par Amount 2004 2004 Par Amount
Issues (US$ mil) Issues (US$ mil) Issues (US$ mil)
State authority 1,943 125,595.7 1,978 119,013.3 1,884 102,837.4
Local authority 2,109 59,156.1 2,141 62,572.7 1,837 57,197.4
District 4,351 54,509.7 4,613 56,560.5 4,298 58,235.3
City, Town or Village 4,062 46,948.4 4,330 54,526.9 3,782 53,368.7
State 272 34,042.4 262 48,401.7 241 47,042.6
County/Parish 1,047 23,325.1 1,146 24,479.3 961 23,182.0
College or University 199 7,045.9 226 8,929.4 235 8,860.1
Direct Issuer 69 3,991.1 56 4,244.1 68 5,781.3
Co-op Utility 4 930.0 - -
Total 14,056 355,544.4 14,752 378,727.9 13,306 356,504.8
Indian tribes 4 194.4 6 233.2 5 178.4
If tribes had expanded tax-exempt bonding authority, they could
successfully pursue many projects similar to those listed in Part IV.A,
but they could also undo some of the harms caused by the misguided
federal policies such as allotment. 5  For example, repurchasing
previously allotted ancestral homeland would be a potential use for
tax-exempt bonds, yet statutory restrictions and the extreme
interpretation by the IRS have resulted in some highly unfortunate
271. Thomson Financial Data Extract, supra note 197. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, state
and local governments issued $355.5 billion, $379 billion, and $356.5 billion dollars of tax-
exempt debt, respectively. Id.
272. Id. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued $194.4 million, $233.3
million, and $178.4 million dollars of tax-exempt debt, respectively. Id.
273. As of November 2005 there were 561 federally recognized Indian tribes and
Alaskan native villages that could potentially issue municipal debt, as compared to 87,575
state, county, and local governmental entities. See Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible To Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 70 Fed.
Reg. 71,194, 71,194 (Nov. 25, 2005); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, VOL. 1, No. 1, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION (2002),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021xl.pdf. In 2002, these non-tribal
governmental entities issued 14,056 tax-exempt bonds. Thomson Financial Data Extract,
supra note 197. Assuming the same ratio of issuers to bonds, the expected number of
tribal issues would have been ninety, significantly more than the four tribal bonds issued
that year.
274. Clarkson, supra note 1, at 1.
275. See supra Part I (discussing allotment).
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outcomes. In one instance, a tribe was interested in repurchasing
some ancestral homeland adjacent to land that it already owned.27 6
Unfortunately, the land in question was farmland with an existing
crop of corn nearing maturity. The tribe wanted to issue tax-exempt
bonds to purchase the land but was advised that if they harvested the
corn, the tax-exempt status of their bonds could be jeopardized. The
tribe was forced to let the corn rot in order to preserve the tax-
exempt status of the bonds.
In another case, a tribe had the opportunity to repurchase 23,000
acres of ancestral homeland for approximately $5.5 million.277 Most
of the land in question had been over-forested, but a small section
containing harvestable timber remained that would help the tribe
afford the land purchase. Again, the restrictions in the Tax Code
meant that the tribe would not be able to harvest timber on the land,
and they could barely afford the interest payments even at tax-
exempt rates. Fortunately, the author, along with another colleague,
was able to develop a structure that allowed the tribe to afford the
necessary debt service, and the tribe was able to purchase the land.
C. Expanding Tribal Tax-Exempt Bonding Authority Will Actually
Increase Federal Revenues
In addition to the economic rationale for expanding tribal tax-
exempt bonding authority, a stronger argument suggests that such an
expansion would actually increase federal tax revenues. Given the
high levels of unemployment throughout Indian Country, labor
market constraints do not exist, and thus presently unemployed
individuals will likely fill any jobs created because of projects funded
with tax-exempt bonds. Those individuals will pay income and social
security taxes, and their employers will contribute additional payroll
taxes. Even without factoring in the reduction in welfare transfer
payments that result from increased employment and increased per
capita income, a sound economic model should clearly demonstrate
the positive federal revenue impact of increased tribal bonding
authority.
Conversely, the maintenance of the current restrictions on tribal
tax-exempt bonding authority has a negative impact on federal tax
revenues. Since these restrictions keep otherwise viable projects from
276. Telephone Interview with Robert Burpo, President, First Am. Fin. Advisors (Mar.
9, 2005).
277. See Memorandum from Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa on Variable
Rate Demand Bonds (Sept. 30, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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being funded, the federal treasury is losing out on tax revenues that
would otherwise be generated in the absence of these restrictions.
Sound fiscal logic and the obvious policy imperative strongly suggest
that Congress should eliminate restrictions on tribal tax-exempt
bonding authority.
As an illustration, consider a fictional golf course that a tribe
would like to develop as part of an overall economic development
plan.278 The tribe would need to borrow $5 million to develop a golf
course that would generate more than $200,000 per year in federal
income taxes from employees and return a modest $25,000 per year to
the tribe in profits, assuming that the tribe could finance the project
at tax-exempt rates.279 By themselves, the additional federal income
taxes generated would more than offset the $175,000 federal tax-
exempt "subsidy." The positive federal revenue impact would be
even greater if the increased level of employment also resulted in a
reduction in welfare transfer payments.
If, however, the tribe cannot obtain tax-exempt financing rates
(as appears to be the case in the current environment), then the
project would generate a $150,000 annual loss, and most tribes would
not be able to afford the project. The wages would not be generated,
and the concomitant increase in federal revenues would never
materialize. Given the number of tribes that would pursue similar
projects if given expanded tax-exempt bonding authority, the lack of
such authority costs the federal government millions each year.280
278. This model was first presented to the Senate Finance Committee during a hearing
on May 23, 2006. See Clarkson, supra note 1, at 9-11. Based on information from a 2002
report from the University of Georgia, annual payroll is estimated at $1,350,000 and other
operating expenses are estimated at $300,000. See GA. AGRIC. EXPERIMENT STATIONS,
COLL. OF AGRIC. AND ENVTL. SCIS., UNIV. OF GA., REVENUE PROFILE OF GOLF
COURSES IN GEORGIA 12-13, available at http://pubs.caes.uga.edu/caespubs/ES-pubs/
RR687.pdf.
279. Assume the same tax-exempt and taxable rates as the example in note 23, supra.
At 6.5%, interest expense would be approximately $325,000 per year (simple interest
without a principal payment is also assumed in order to simplify the model).
280. Using the expected number of projects based on the figures in note 273, supra, the
annual federal tax revenue loss alone would be $2.4 million dollars, assuming that all of
the remaining eighty-six projects each year would be identical golf course developments.
If the ratio of tax revenue to project size from the golf course model can be applied to the
average project size for all bonds issued in 2004, however, then the annual federal tax
revenue loss is more than $80 million. These figures do not include other federal revenue
savings, such as those associated with reductions in federal entitlement payments resulting
from increased employment levels.
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V. APPLICATION OF THE MEMMI TYPOLOGY SUGGESTS AN
ALTERNATE RATIONALE
Although the economic arguments in favor of expanded tribal
tax-exempt bonding authority should be sufficient, additional moral
arguments exist. Elucidating those arguments, however, requires
forging headlong into an inevitable discussion of racism, a
significantly less comfortable conversation. The legitimate concern
exists that leveling the charge of racism might cause some to dismiss
the underlying merits of the arguments presented in this Article. On
the other hand, noted Indian law scholar Robert Williams argues that
"Indian rights will never be justly protected by any legal system or
civil society that continues to talk about Indians as if they are
uncivilized, unsophisticated, and lawless savages." '281 Thus, although
the economic rationale for expanding tribal tax-exempt bonding
authority provides ample justification on its own, an analysis of the
discriminatory and hostile treatment of tribal tax-exempt bonds may
also prove persuasive.
Referring to a practice of adverse and differential treatment as
racism is not a charge to be levied lightly, however, as an accusation
of racism is one of the most incendiary charges that can be leveled in
our society. To do so armed with empirical evidence, however, falls
directly in line with Professor Williams's strategy of "direct
confrontation that challenges the continuing use of racial stereotypes
[and imagery] ... in thinking and talking about Indian rights by the
Court [and] the U.S. Congress." '282 As Williams notes, the use of such
empirical evidence was also a strong component of the successful
strategy employed in Brown v. Board of Education.283 One challenge
in discussing racism, however, is that the precise meaning of "racism"
is often not agreed upon.2 8 In order to clarify the charge, this Article
will use an objective definition of racism based on the writings of
Albert Memmi. 285 Various scholars have attempted to define racism,
281. See WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at xxviii. In comparing the struggle for Indian
rights with the successful strategies employed by Thurgood Marshall in arguing Brown v.
Board of Education, Williams argues that "the legal history of racism in America teaches
us that the most successful minority rights advocates of the twentieth century recognized
that the real waste of time was trying to get a nineteenth-century racist legal doctrine to do
a better job of protecting minority rights." Id. at xxxii.
282. Id. at xxviii.
283. Id. at 209-10 n.58.
284. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, Forward to ALBERT MEMMI, RACISM vii, ix (Steve
Martinot trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 2000) (1982) (noting that "careful attempts at [a]
definition [of racism] are surprisingly rare").
285. See, e.g., MEMMI, supra note 284.
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but many of these attempts have been cast in terms of black-white
interactions.286 When dealing with issues involving Indian tribes,
entities with both racially and politically defining characteristics,
Memmi's typology of racism provides a framework for defining
racism that has significant utility in examining the actions and
perceptions of dominant society relative to Indian tribes.287
Memmi was a Tunisian Jew whose perception of racism was
heavily influenced both by his membership in a group that had a long
history of being subjected to European racism and imperialism as well
as his experience of being a Jew in a predominantly Arab country.
Memmi also personally suffered under the power of European
colonialism and racism, particularly when the Nazis imprisoned him
in a work camp during World War II. Based on these and other
experiences, Memmi proposed the following definition of racism: "a
generalizing definition and valuation of differences, whether real or
imaginary, to the advantage of the one defining and deploying them
..., and to the detriment of the one subjected to the act of definition
... , whose purpose is to justify (social or physical) hostility and
assault ... 288
His analysis also discusses four essential "moments" of racism:
1. "[A]n insistence on difference, whether 'real or
imaginary.' " The perceived difference can be "somatic,
cultural, religious, etc.;" the emphasis is on "the
discernment of its existence, rather than its nature or
content."
2. The imposition of a negative valuation "upon those seen as
differing, implying (by the act of imposition) a positive
valuation for those imposing it."
286. See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM:
THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 19 (1997) (defining racism in the
context of violence as "a belief in the genetic predisposition of Blacks towards greater
violence, from uncritical acceptance of the Black cultural stereotype, or from personal
racial animus"); JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 10 (1970) (explaining
the history of white-black racism in America).
287. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 71 (discussing the racial discourse of the
Supreme Court's opinions); Williams, supra note 77 (providing an "account of an early
nineteenth century discourse of tribal sovereignty").
288. MEMMI, supra note 284, at 100 (emphasis omitted). Memmi's original definition
was quite similar: "the generalized and final assigning of values to real or imaginary
differences, to the accuser's benefit and at his victim's expense, in order to justify the
former's own privileges or aggression." ALBERT MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN: NOTES
TOWARD A PORTRAIT 185 (1968).
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3. This differential valuation rendering the "difference
unignorable" is made absolute by generalizing to an entire
group that "is then deprecated in turn."
4. "[T]he negative valuation imposed upon that group
becomes the legitimization and justification" for present or
possible hostility, aggression, or privilege.289
The power of Memmi's typology of racism lies in the fact that his
definition does not require that the perceived differences be only
biological in nature, as (real or imaginary) cultural differences could
just as easily be used to justify aggression or privilege as could
biological differences. Such has been the case with Indian tribes, as
many of the policies directed towards them were based on a hostile
perception of tribalism 29° while others were based on negative
perceptions of biological differences.291
Noted postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha posits a similar notion
of "colonial discourse," suggesting that its use is "an apparatus of
power ... that turns on the recognition and disavowal of
racial/cultural/historical differences '' 2 and that the "objective of
colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of
degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify
conquest and to establish systems of administration and
instruction. , 293
Just as Professor Williams clearly demonstrates the racism
inherent in the legal discourse of the removal period294 using the
Memmi typology, 95 the next two subsections will use that same
typology to explore whether the final version of the Tribal Tax Status
Act was shaped by perceptions of difference that were generalized to
a broader group and to determine how the negative connotations of
the perceived difference were used to justify the hostility or
aggression against the broader group, either during the legislative
process or in subsequent IRS enforcement actions. When analyzed
within Memmi's typology, the actions of Representative Gibbons and
the ultimate acquiescence of his legislative colleagues provide just
289. Steve Martinot, The Double Consciousness, Introduction to MEMMI, supra note
284, at xvii-xviii.
290. See supra Part III.
291. See id.
292. HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 100 (Routledge Classics 2004)
(1994).
293. Id. at 101.
294. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text (discussing Indian removal).
295. See Williams, supra note 77, at 239-58.
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such evidence. Details of the IRS enforcement actions provide
further evidence.
A. Examining the Actions of Representative Gibbons
1. The Strategy of Difference
Professor Williams has carefully documented the discourse of
difference regarding Indians from the moment of first contact
between Europeans and the indigenous inhabitants of North
America. 96 By the time a thirty-three-year-old Sam Gibbons was
first elected to the Florida legislature in 1953, Indian tribes were
already well entrenched as different in the minds of many Florida
politicians. Having grown up in the 1920s and 1930s, Gibbons was
almost certainly familiar with the dominant view of Indians as
anachronistic savages, wholly separate from civilized society.2 97
Having attended all-white institutions for his undergraduate and legal
education, 98 the rhetoric and practice of segregation likely influenced
Gibbons. As a practicing lawyer, Gibbons might possibly have taken
note of the negative language used to describe Indian tribes in the
1950s, including language used by the Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and
that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in
return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the
conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.2 99
Although they were probably a source of campfire stories during
Gibbons' schoolboy years, the Florida Seminoles were recognized as
a sovereign tribe in 1957 and were thus governed by separate laws
296. See id. at 262-65; see generally WILLIAMS, supra note 71 (examining racist rhetoric
by the Supreme Court in its Indian law decisions).
297. See generally ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN (1979)
(discussing white images of Indians).
298. Gibbons attended the University of Florida as an undergraduate and graduated
from the University of Florida Law School in 1947. See Biographical Information on
Gibbons, Sam Melville, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scriptslbiodisplay.pl?index=G000153 (last visited Apr. 8,
2007). The University of Florida did not admit black students until 1955. See University
of Florida History, http://www.ufl.edu/history/1948.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
299. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955). Note that this
opinion came the year after Brown's repudiation of such racist discourse as applied to
African Americans. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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and regulations than other Floridians, such as title 25 of the U.S.
Code and title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Even if
Gibbons was not overtly racist, Williams notes that a substantial body
of empirical and theoretical research exists "demonstrat[ing] that the
cognitive biases that can give rise to prejudice and racist attitudes can
operate in an unconscious, automatic, uncontrolled fashion."3 °
Gibbons was probably not alone, however. After centuries of
overt and covert hostility by the United States and the tribe's
weakened economic state, the Florida Seminoles probably did not
resemble a sovereign government in the minds of most Floridians,
either. Even after they were acknowledged as a sovereign entity, the
likely perception was that the tribal government did not provide
services itself, but instead relied on the federal government. At a
minimum, the "savage" existence of the Florida Seminoles during his
childhood and continuing through his election to Congress would
certainly have entrenched the idea of the tribe as being different in
Gibbons' mind, although such an assumption is based on a
combination of speculation by the author and conversations with
those who interacted with Gibbons on the Ways and Means
Committee.
2. The Assignment of Negative Values to Difference
A long-running dispute between the Florida Seminole Tribe and
Representative Gibbons illustrates the imputation of negative values
to difference. By all accounts, Gibbons harbored a lingering hostility
toward Indian interests stemming from his involvement in a tribal
land deal in which trust land was reportedly exploited for private
benefit in the construction of a 1400-seat bingo hall and a cigarette
shop.30 1
During excavation for a city parking garage in Tampa in 1979,
bones of 140 Seminole Indians were unearthed on the site.3°2 The
discovery threatened to bring the parking garage project to a halt, but
the Seminoles proposed to move their ancestors' remains to new land
as a solution if they could obtain the necessary space.303 Tampa and
Florida officials accepted the offer, and federal officials, including
Gibbons, helped the tribe obtain new trust land for this purpose. The
Seminoles did, in fact, rebury the bones and erect a museum above
300. WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at 164.
301. John MacCormack, New Riches Grow from Old Burial Ground, MIAMI HERALD,
May 31, 1983, at 6A.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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the tomb.3" They also, however, constructed a cigarette shop and
large bingo parlor on the land, both financed by a private partnership
that in exchange received 47% of the proceeds from the two
operations. °5
In 1979, bingo was already established as a legitimate municipal
function, since municipal fire departments had long generated
operational revenues from bingo. In a similar fashion, commercial
gaming on Indian reservations in the United States began modestly as
a response to a 1975 fire on the Oneida Indian reservation in Verona,
New York, that destroyed two trailers and killed several people.30 6
The reservation had neither a fire department nor fire-fighting
equipment, and two Oneidas perished in the blaze. To prevent such
tragedies in the future, reported a tribal representative, the Oneidas
decided "to raise money for [their] own fire department ... the way
all fire departments raise money: through bingo."3 7
By the time the facility in Tampa opened, the Seminoles were
already operating a separate high-stakes bingo facility in Hollywood,
Florida.30 8  The Seminole Tribe contracted with a non-Indian
organization to build and manage its bingo hall. The agreement
called for the managers to receive 45% of the profits after repayment
of a $1 million construction loan. The enterprise was a success, and
the Seminoles repaid the loan in less than six months."' The
Seminoles also fought the State in the courts when Florida authorities
tried to close the Seminoles' bingo hall in 1981. The tribe argued that
Florida did not have the authority to prohibit gaming on the Seminole
reservation. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit agreed310 and affirmed the
right of the Seminoles to run their bingo game and pay out
unrestricted prizes without interference from the State of Florida.3"
Although the Seminoles had always indicated to officials that
they planned to use their new land for economic development
projects, Gibbons and other officials were "incensed" and "accused
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Gavin Clarkson & James Sebenius, Leveraging Tribal Sovereignty for
Economic Opportunity: A Strategic Negotiations Perspective 26 (Dec. 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
307. Dennis McAuliffe, Jr., Casinos Deal Indians a Winning Hand, WASH. POST, Mar.
5, 1996, at Al.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1981).
311. Id. at 316.
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the tribe of hiding its true intentions about the use of the land., 312
With its negative view of commercial activity by the Seminoles, and
with Gibbons' support, Florida unsuccessfully sued to halt the
activities of the tribe by challenging the trust status of the land in
Tampa.313 By all available accounts Representative Gibbons held a
lasting hostility toward Indian interests as a result of the Seminole
burial ground episode.314
3. Generalization
Representative Gibbons' reported hostility is not limited to the
tribe in his district, however, as he held a particular suspicion that
Indians anywhere could not be trusted and would use any opportunity
to finance undesirable gambling operations.315  In his letter to
Treasury Secretary James Baker, he insinuated that the tribes were
not really acting as governments and used the leveraged buyouts as
exemplars, all the while ignoring that the revenue generated by those
projects went to fund essential governmental functions.316 If not the
first, Gibbons was certainly one of the early congressional leaders to
put forward the generalized notion that any commercial or revenue-
generating activity was somehow less "governmental" if conducted by
a tribe, as that would make it a "far cry from schools, streets, and
sewers." 317 This generalization clearly privileged, to the detriment of
the tribes, the commercial elements of many state and local
governmental enterprises funded with tax-exempt debt.3 8
Various accounts have confirmed that Gibbons's grudge
prompted him to join the Tribal Tax Status Act Conference
Committee to deny tribes meaningful bond authority.3 19 Emma Gross
312. Aprill, supra note 30, at 346 (citing MacCormack, supra note 301).
313. Fla. Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 768 F.2d 1248, 1250-51
(11th Cir. 1985)
314. See Aprill, supra note 30, at 346 n.77 ("Whether or not true, [Gibbons' reputation]
has come to be accepted and believed.").
315. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 30, at 368 n.146.
316. Aprill, supra note 30, at 361.
317. Id. (referring specifically to cement plants and mirror factories).
318. This hostility towards tribal governments that engaged in any sort of commercial
or revenue-generating activity would only get worse as Indian gaming revenues increased.
See Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 306, at 32. For a discussion of ERISA, see also infra
note 384.
319. Aprill writes that "[t]his experience prepared Representative Gibbons to object to
the tribal bond provision in the Senate bill." Aprill, supra note 30, at 346. The Bond
Buyer reported that Gibbons "wage[d] a campaign in 1987 against bonds issued by Indian
tribes." Joan Pryde, Meet Sam Gibbons: Rostenkowski's Stand-In Is Not an Admirer of
Private Activity Bonds, BOND BUYER, Aug. 13, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR
550956.
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wrote in 1989 that Gibbons's "disillusionment with his Indian
constituency is supposed to be the reason that he currently opposes
Indian interests. 3 °20 Although Representative Gibbons developed an
accepted reputation as hostile toward tribal interests in his district, his
animosity extended to tribal interests everywhere.
4. Justification of Hostility
Gibbon's belief that Indians in general are not trustworthy
issuers of public debt coupled with his powerful position in the House
led to the adverse outcomes in 1982 and again in 1987. Is it possible
that Gibbons based his justifications for hostile treatment of tribal
tax-exempt debt on something other than a negative perception of
difference between tribal governments and other state and local
governments? Gibbons did have a reputation as an active opponent
of private activity bonds. He has been described in various reports as
"a longtime opponent of tax-exempt, private-activity bonds, 321 as
having "maintained a steady opposition to private-activity bonds, 3 22
and as "traditionally ... an antagonist toward public finance. 3 23 Thus,
it might be reasonable to argue that Gibbons opposed broad tribal
bonding authority not necessarily because he was hostile to Indian
interest but, rather, because he was hostile toward broad tax-based
public finance authority in general.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, Gibbons not only
increased his opposition to tax-exempt bond authority in the case of
the Tribal Tax Status Act, but also supported "tax-exempt financing
when it would benefit his [non-Indian] constituents." '324 Gibbons's
effort to create a new category of tax-exempt bonds to finance the
construction and improvement of space centers in Florida3" indicates
that he was perfectly willing to support broad-based bonding
authority when Indian tribes were not the beneficiaries. Second, the
record is clear that the limitations on tribal bond authority not
applicable to states or municipalities have been enacted "largely at
Gibbons' urging. "326 Thus, the efforts of Representative Gibbons,
albeit with the consent of the other conferees, imposed a drastic
320. EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD AMERICAN
INDIANS 84 (1989).
321. Craig Ferris, Foe of Private-Activity Debt To Leave Congress, BOND BUYER, Mar.
5, 1996, at 5, available at 1996 WLNR 742958.
322. Pryde, supra note 319.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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limitation on tribes that, to this day, gives them access to only a
narrow sector of the tax-free capital market. It is undeniable that
Gibbons largely created what today remains a blatant discrepancy
between tribes' and states' bonding authority.
The timing of Gibbons's legislative efforts as well as his 1987
letter to Treasury Secretary James Baker complaining about tribal
tax-exempt bonds3 27 is also telling. In 1986, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the litigation regarding the Seminole's land-into-
trust application for the Tampa property,328 so having lost in the effort
to fight tribal economic development in his own district, Gibbons
expanded his efforts in 1987 to thwart economic development
throughout Indian Country.
The results of Gibbons's actions are obvious. Because of the
additional restrictions imposed on Indian tribes that do not apply to
state and local governments, tribes cannot issue private activity bonds
similar to those issued by state and local governments, 329 nor can they
issue tax-exempt debt unless "substantially all" of the borrowed
proceeds pass the ill-defined essential governmental function test.
B. Examining the IRS's Enforcement Activity
Through its enforcement activities, the IRS continues to
propagate this discrimination in the Tax Code. The IRS has chosen
to pursue the most restrictive interpretation possible in its
enforcement, exacerbating the discriminatory effect. In fairness to
the IRS, however, it does not have the freedom to ignore or fail to
enforce a statute. On the other hand, the enforcement actions of the
IRS suggest that it is further exacerbating the impact of § 7871 by
pursuing an extremely narrow, and arguably incorrect, interpretation
of the statute.
1. The Strategy of Difference
Although the stated congressional intent of the Tribal Tax Status
Act was to treat tribes like states, the actions of Representative
Gibbons resulted in portions of the statute that specifically
differentiated tribes from states. Thus, the IRS cannot be faulted for
applying § 7871 only to tribes, as that is its statutory obligation. The
important question to consider, however, is whether the IRS views
327. Aprill, supra note 30, at 318.
328. Fla. Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1186 (1986).
329. See supra note 33.
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tribal activities as different, and somehow less governmental, when
compared to identical activities performed by state and local
governments.
2. The Assignment of Negative Values to Difference
In the eyes of the IRS, if a tribe is involved with a commercial
activity, it is somehow less of a government, even if the activity is one
commonly conducted by states or if revenues from that activity fund
basic governmental functions. The IRS does not seem to take the
same position with states that are involved with commercial activities,
such as state-run liquor stores; state-operated hotels, resorts, and
convention centers; or public golf courses. Thus, the perception of
difference between tribal commercial activity and state commercial
activity is a false difference. Nonetheless, the IRS continues to insist
that such a difference is meaningful relative to tribes. For example,
Charles Anderson of the IRS's tax-exempt bond enforcement
program, speaking about the Paiute golf course, recently stated:
[A]nyone other than the law firm issuing an unqualified opinion
and maybe being sued by a tribe would concede that a
hypothetical golf complex-having multiple prestige courses in
a resort town with a website advertising planned hotels and
casinos, and who has marketed the courses in partnership with
travel promoters-is essentially commercial in nature.330
Anderson continued:
If there are more golf holes than tribal members it is probably
commercial and intended solely for tourists. If no tribal
members work there and they all collect a dividend, it is
probably commercial.... I don't think Congress ever
anticipated several dozen people getting six-figure checks due
to a resort financed by tax-exempt bonds.33 1
Anderson's words are clearly unencumbered by knowledge of
the myriad of publicly financed resorts, hotels, and golf courses,332 and
they strongly suggest an imposition of a negative value on tribal
commercial activities.
An August 9, 2006, advance notice of proposed rulemaking from
the IRS reflects a similar negative imputation of value. In that notice,
330. McConnell, supra note 208.
331. Id.
332. See supra Part IV.A.
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the IRS suggests that tribal bonds would only be tax exempt if there
are
(1) numerous State and local governments with general taxing
powers that have been conducting the activity and financing it
with tax-exempt governmental bonds, (2) State and local
governments with general taxing powers have been conducting
the activity and financing it with tax-exempt governmental
bonds for many years, and (3) the activity is not a commercial
or industrial activity,
even if states and local governments routinely engage in such
activities for commercial purposes.333
Apparently, the IRS did not even wait for the comment period to
end before making the proposed rules its official position. In a
Technical Advice Memorandum ("TAM") 334 issued two weeks before
comments were due, the IRS declared that the proposed standards
were already the law. In fact, according to Howard Jacobsen of Akin
Gump, the IRS has issued multiple adverse determinations based on
the proposed standards rather than waiting for the regulatory
comment process to conclude.335 Clearly, the IRS has a strongly
negative view of tribal commercial activity relative to state and local
governmental commercial activity.
3. Generalization
Since the Tax Code applies to all tribes equally, the
generalization of the negative view of tribal commercial activity is
automatic. Tribes throughout the United States have been victims of
this aggressive enforcement of an arguably racist statute that
effectively stifles tribes' tax-free bonding authority. The
communications from some at the IRS seem to give the impression
that the IRS believes that all tribes are wealthy tribes engaged in
gaming and are thus not entitled to tax-exempt treatment, since they
would merely be receiving a subsidy for commercial activity. This
generalization of tribal economic status is particularly harmful to
poorer tribes, as these restrictions on the scope of what can be
financed with tax-exempt debt in particular deny poor tribes the
333. 71 Fed. Reg. 45,474, 45, 475 (Aug. 9, 2006) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 &
602).
334. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 146957-05 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-tege/tam_200704019.pdf.
335. See Letter from Howard E. Jacobsen, Akin Gump Straus Hauer & Feld, to
Donald Korb, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv. (Feb. 1, 2007) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
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opportunity to address their glaring infrastructure and economic
development needs. Tribes with substantial natural resources or
significant gaming operations have the option of financing certain
activities on a taxable basis even if, absent a restrictive Tax Code,
they would be able to finance those activities on a tax-exempt basis.
As mentioned earlier, however, poorer tribes do not have that luxury.
The IRS's generalization of the restrictive provision of § 7871 to
all tribes has also meant a substantially higher audit risk for tribal
bonds, as tribal governments are also victims of a demonstrably
disproportionate number of IRS enforcement actions. Less than 1%
of the tax-exempt municipal offerings are audited by the IRS each
year, but direct tribal tax-exempt issuances are thirty-three times
more likely to be audited within four years of issue,336 and 100% of
tribal conduit issuances have been or are currently being challenged
by the IRS.337 In all of these cases, the tribes financed activities that
had previously been financed by state and local governments without
any challenge from the IRS.
In the specific instance of the Paiute golf course audit, in arguing
that that the golf course was not "intended to meet the recreational
needs of [the] Tribe or that it is anything other than a commercial
enterprise of [the] Tribe, 338 the IRS is apparently making another
generalization that Indians do not play golf, and if they do play golf,
they only play at courses that are too ugly to attract a non-Indian
golfer.
4. Justification of Hostility
In a 2005 TAM,339 the IRS justified its apparent hostility towards
tribal conduit financing by suggesting that allowing tribes to use the
conduit mechanism "would run counter to Congressional intent."34
Even though the legislative history cited in the TAM suggests that
water treatment plants fall squarely within the definition of an
essential governmental function,34' the IRS is nonetheless challenging
the tax-exempt bonds issued by the Morongo Tribe for "water and
336. See supra Part III.E.
337. See supra Part III.F (discussing IRS enforcement); supra note 227.
338. FSA, supra note 208, at 5.
339. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 142470-05 (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-wd/0603028.pdf.
340. Id. at 6.
341. H.R. REP. No. 97-984, at 16-17 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580, 4601 (noting that tribes are tax-exempt if proceeds are directed at
public utilities).
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wastewater system improvements, roadway improvements, and public
parking facilities. "342
As discussed earlier, the IRS's most publicized enforcement of
the essential governmental function test occurred in August of 2002
when the IRS advised the Las Vegas Paiutes that construction of a
public golf course is "other than an essential governmental function
within the meaning of section 7871(e). ' ' 3 The IRS advised that it
would deny the tax exemption based on its reading of the
"customarily performed" standard provided by the 1987
amendment.3" The IRS acknowledged that "it is likely that
construction and operation of golf courses are customary
governmental functions," but nonetheless concluded that the
admittedly commercial nature of the project rendered it outside the
scope of the tribe's tax-free bond authority as limited by § 7871(e). 45
The IRS reasoned that Congress did not define "customarily" in the
statute and that "there is an argument" that such commercial
ventures cannot be considered within § 7871(e). 36 Section 7871(e)
simply defines "essential governmental function" as excluding
projects "not customarily performed by State and local
governments," saying nothing of the commercial or noncommercial
nature of those activities. 47 Mary J. Streitz of Dorsey & Whitney
explains that
[o]ver-relying on selected portions of the legislative history, the
FSA suggested that tribal governments may not finance
"commercial or industrial facilities" with tax-exempt bonds
even where such facilities satisfy the customary performance test.
Although the House Ways and Means Committee had
indicated a concern about tribal governments financing
commercial and industrial activities with tax-exempt bonds, the
committee chose to adopt only the customary performance test
to address its concern.348
342. Rich Saskal, IRS Takes Closer Look at Calif. Tribal Deal's Tax-Exempt Status,
BOND BUYER, Aug. 30, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 13911589.
343. FSA, supra note 208, at 1.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(e) (2000).
348. Letter from Mary J. Streitz, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to Timothy L. Jones,
Internal Revenue Serv. 2 (Nov. 26, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter Streitz Letter].
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Streitz concludes that "[t]he entire legislative history reinforces that
the statutory test turns on the frequency of a government practice,
not on any other requirement. 3 49
The argument set forth by the IRS is that the golf course was not
"intended to meet the recreational needs of [the] Tribe" and that it
was nothing more "than a commercial enterprise of [the] Tribe. 3 5°
Although other public golf courses can be considered essential
governmental functions, in this case the IRS maintains that "the
probable role of the Golf Course in the community contrasts with
that of the more typical golf course developed by a state or local
government. 3 51 Given the IRS's perceived unlikelihood that tribal
members would use the course for recreational uses, the "Golf
Course could be seen as disproportionate when viewed as a
community amenity, making the balance between community
recreation and commercial implications more significantly tilted
toward the latter than is likely to be typical." '352 Mary Streitz counters
that, in this analysis, the FSA overlooks the fact that "many state and
local government golf courses are destination golf courses intended to
attract visitors from outside the community in which the golf course is
located, thereby promoting economic development in the community
and raising revenues for the state or local government." '353 Therefore,
the FSA essentially says that Indian tribes cannot utilize tax-free debt
to construct golf courses and accompanying clubhouses if the courses
pass a subjective line of being "too nice for tribal members." One
wonders if the public courses in places like Palm Beach or Torrey
Pines would encounter these same difficulties. The FSA admits that
all publicly built and operated golf courses "are developed to enhance
the lifestyle of both golfing and non-golfing citizens of the community
and perhaps to create jobs," but nonetheless denies the tribe's
admitted effort to "further the economic development of [the] Tribe
and to reduce [the] Tribe's dependence on" its limited available
resources,35 4 because these are commercial rather than recreational
pursuits.
349. Id. at 2.
350. FSA, supra note 208, at 5.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Streitz Letter, supra note 348, at 3.
354. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200247012 (Nov. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0247012.pdf. Note that this sentence was blacked out where
the quote ends. See id. This remaining portion is the author's interpretation of this part of
the FSA.
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The FSA stated that "[t]he legislative history of § 7871(e)
indicates that Congress meant not to include commercial or industrial
facilities as essential governmental functions even if such functions
were commonly financed with tax-exempt bonds by state or local
governments." '355 Indeed, the legislative history indicates that tribes
were faced with a more limited authority than states and
municipalities. As noted above, the House Committee Report on the
1987 amendment stated that only customarily publicly financed
projects are intended to be within the tribes' authority,
"notwithstanding that isolated instances of a State or local
government issuing bonds for another activity may occur." '356 Thus,
the IRS acknowledged that "there were at least 2,645 public golf
courses in 1998 ... and it is probable that the number has grown, 3 57
yet in the same FSA memorandum, the IRS relied on legislative
history deeming projects that may be financed by states with tax-free
bonds "in isolated instances" as being beyond tribal authority.
The FSA finally recommended not litigating the Paiute's bond
exemption because it would "be difficult to argue that Golf Course is
so commercial in nature that state and local governments would not
own and operate similar enterprises." '358  Additionally, it
acknowledged that "some courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have
adopted the principle that federal statutes are to be construed
liberally in favor of Native Americans, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit. 3 59 In short, the FSA concluded that the
IRS's position was untenable based on existing public practices and
judicial rulings, but the IRS nonetheless proceeded with hostile
enforcement actions.
The 2002 FSA has inspired a number of criticisms, most recently
in the form of a report issued by the Advisory Committee to the
Internal Revenue Service on Tax Exempt and Government Entities
("ACT").3" The ACT report is harshly critical of the FSA,
emphasizing that public golf courses are in fact customarily owned
355. Id. (emphasis added).
356. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1139 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1,
2315-749 (emphasis added).
357. FSA, supra note 208, at 6.
358. Id. at 7; see also supra note 208 and accompanying text.
359. FSA, supra note 208, at 8.
360. See ETCITTY, supra note 4, at 11-13; LENOR A. SCHEFFLER & ROBERT L. GipS,
ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT & GOV'T ENTITIES, SURVEY AND REVIEW OF
EXISTING INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOR INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 12
(2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/p4344.pdf (noting that the FSA has
caused "consternation and a sense of bias" in the tribunal government community).
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and operated by state and local governments. The ACT report
further requests that the IRS cease any new audits and enforcement
initiatives, withdraw the 2002 FSA memorandum, and, most
importantly, clarify that essential governmental functions for
purposes of § 7871 be construed in accordance with the term
"essential governmental function" as it is used in § 115 of the Internal
Revenue Code for benefits accruing to state and local governments. 61
Section 115 provides that "[giross income does not include ...
income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential
governmental function and accruing to a State or any political
subdivision thereof."362  The IRS takes a broad view of what is
excludable under § 115.363 In determining whether the entity can
exclude its income from federal income tax liability, the IRS employs
a three-part test: (1) whether the entity makes or saves money for a
state or local government, (2) whether its assets revert to the state
upon dissolution, and (3) whether there is any private benefit.3" In a
sharp contrast to its approach in the 2002 FSA to defining an essential
governmental function as excluding any commercial activity when
conducted by a tribe, the IRS has reasoned that a state investment
fund for cash balances constitutes an essential governmental function.
As mentioned earlier, several states have even issued tax-exempt
bonds in support of their gaming operations such as casinos, lotteries,
and horse racing.365 Similarly, a number of municipalities have
financed hotels and convention centers with tax-exempt bonds.366
Given the uncertainty as to whether these activities have reached a
level of "customary" occurrence, tribes have thus far been unable to
borrow directly on a tax-exempt basis to finance their own gaming or
hotel facilities.3 67  For purposes of § 115, however, the IRS has,
without intervention by Congress, effectively defined any activity that
makes or saves the government money as an essential governmental
function. This definition encompasses the very purpose of the Las
361. ETCITrY, supra note 4, at 11-11.
362. 26 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
363. See Rev. Rul. 77-261, 1977-2 C.B. 45; see also John F. Theberge & Diana A.
Imholtz, Tax-Exempt Financings Involving Indian Tribal Governments, 41 EXEMPT ORG.
TAX REV. 181,182, 185 (2003).
364. Theberge & Imholtz, supra note 363, at 182 (citing Ellen P. Aprill, The Integral,
the Essential, and the Instrumental: Federal Income Tax Treatment of Governmental
Affiliates, 23 J. CORP. L. 803, 814 (1998)).
365. See supra Part IV.A.
366. See id.
367. See HYATr ET AL., supra note 27, at 19.
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Vegas Paiute golf course, which the IRS has reasoned does not
qualify as an essential governmental function.3"
Despite the arguably racist heritage of the essential
governmental function test, the IRS is also using an extreme
interpretation of that test to justify its apparent hostility to tribal
conduit financing. Despite the formal legality of the conduit
arrangements, the IRS has challenged any and all conduit borrowing
engaged in by Indian tribes,36 9 arguing that " '[i]n general, any
transaction done indirectly that cannot be done directly is
troubling.' "370 As noted earlier,3 71 however, each conduit financing-
tribal or non-tribal-involves doing indirectly that which cannot be
done directly, but the IRS has not challenged any non-tribal conduit
financings on that basis.
Of the conduit bonds challenged by the IRS, three involve the
hotel and casino complexes in Florida built by the Seminole Tribe.
These projects together utilized $345 million in tax-exempt bonds.372
The conduit issuer for these projects was the Capital Trust Agency,
an entity created by the city of Gulf Breeze and the town of Century,
both in Florida.373 Another challenged conduit borrowing involves
the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in which the California
Statewide Communities Development Authority issued $145 million
in tax-exempt bonds.374 In the Cabazon case, the tribe received a
letter from the IRS indicating that the tribe " 'may have issued an
obligation.., substantially all of the proceeds of which were not to be
used in an exercise of an essential governmental function of the
tribe.' ,,375 The final conduit bond under scrutiny was issued on behalf
of the Santa Ana Pueblo of New Mexico for a hotel development.376
In 2005, the IRS issued a different TAM taking the position that
tribal proceeds from conduit financings are subject to the "essential
368. See FSA, supra note 208, at 5.
369. See supra note 227 (discussing conduit bond audits).
370. See Susanna Duff Barnett, $145.5M Cabazon Deal Under Scrutiny: IRS Steps Up
Probes of Indian Tribes, BOND BUYER, Aug. 6, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR
1252400 (quoting Charles Anderson, manager of field operations for the IRS tax-exempt
bond division).
371. See Part III.F (discussing IRS enforcement against conduit bonds); supra text
accompanying note 222.
372. See Shelly Sigo, IRS Suggests Private-Letter Rulings to Casino-Building Tribes,
BOND BUYER, May 14, 2004, at 3, available at 2004 WLNR 1265069.
373. Id.
374. See Barnett, supra note 370.
375. Id. (quoting a July 29 letter from the IRS).
376. McConnell, N.M. County, supra note 227.
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governmental function" test.377 Mark A. Jarboe of Dorsey & Whitney
criticized this memorandum as an instance of the IRS taking " 'a
results-oriented approach to creating an ambiguity because of what
they think Congress meant rather than what Congress said.' ",378 To
make matters worse, however, the IRS has now taken the more
extreme position that " '[b]onds issued by a state entity where an
Indian tribal government is the conduit borrower are private-activity
bonds even if the proceeds are used for an essential government
function,' "3" even though this most recent position clearly
contradicts the position stated in the earlier TAM that conduit bonds
would be permissible if they satisfied the essential government
function test.8 0
Aside from the IRS's inconsistent and incoherent enforcement
positions on this method of tribal financing, conduit financing itself is
a far less efficient method of accessing tax-free debt than direct
issuance by a tribe. Consider the Seminole case, where issuance costs
amounted to 9.2% of the bond proceeds. 38 1 These fees cut into the
amount available for investment in the tribal enterprise, making the
tribe's income-generating effort less effective and certainly far less
efficient than a direct issuance. Clearly, the source of this method of
debt-financing, untoward in the eyes of the IRS, and expensive for
tribes, is an outgrowth of the stifling effect of the essential
governmental function requirement on tribes' direct access to the tax-
free market. The conduit approach would be altogether unnecessary,
however, if the discriminatory aspects of § 7871 were eliminated.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING TRIBAL TAX-EXEMPT BONDING
AUTHORITY
Having established economic, fiscal, and moral justifications for
expanded tribal tax-exempt bonding authority, it should be clear that
tribes ought to, as a matter of both policy and equity, enjoy a status
identical to the states under the Tax Code in terms of the broad
ability to issue tax-free debt. Indian tribes have for centuries existed
377. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 142470-05 (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-wd/0603028.pdL
378. Alison L. McConnell, IRS: 'Essential Governmental Function' Needed for Conduit
Debt, BOND BUYER, Jan. 23, 2006, at 5, available at 2006 WLNR 1521595 (quoting Mark
A. Jarboe of Dorsey & Whitney).
379. See McConnell, supra note 228 (quoting an unpublished technical advice
memorandum).
380. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 142470-05 (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-wd/0603028.pdf.
381. Sigo, supra note 372.
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in a kind of dual world where they are sovereigns for some purposes
but treated as if their governmental responsibilities are not real for
other purposes. The Tax Code's restriction on tribal tax-free bonding
authority is an example of the latter. This restriction is an
unjustifiable discrimination against Indian tribes by Congress in the
enacting legislation and by the IRS in its enforcement actions.
While legislative proposals have been offered in the past that
would rectify the inequities in § 7871 and put tribal debt on an equal
footing with municipal debt for tax law purposes, such legislation has
yet to pass.382  Although commentators have described the failed
effort in 1975 to place tribes on equal footing with states in the Tax
Code as an attempt at promoting self-determination,383 Congress
chose not to consider alternatives that would address the deeply
rooted obstacles facing tribes when it did pass the Tribal Tax Status
Act. Despite the rhetoric paid to recognizing tribes as governments
and equalizing their tax treatment with that of states, Congress gave
tribes a limited authority to utilize tax-free debt obligations that
effectively limited the tribes to their general obligation bonding
capabilities, which, as noted earlier, is largely illusory for
economically strapped Indian tribes.
Given the level of "commercial" activity funded with tax-exempt
debt by states and local governments, the expanding hostility towards
revenue-generating activity by tribal governments is indefensible in
any intellectually honest manner. Congress itself has recently passed
legislation that acknowledges that tribally sponsored commercial
activities can nonetheless be essential governmental functions.384 This
382. See, e.g., S. 1637, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 2253, 107th Cong. (2001). Senate Bill
1637 was passed by the Senate, but its tribal tax-exempt bond provisions were eliminated
by the Conference Committee in its effort to reconcile with H.R. 4520, which did not
contain the tribal provisions.
383. See Aprill, supra note 30, at 343 (describing the 1975 lobbying effort as part of the
greater Indian effort to achieve "economic independence").
384. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 4, 109th Cong. (2006). Among the
sweeping changes to ERISA contained in the Act, section 906 "clarifies" the applicability
of the "governmental plan" exemption from ERISA to employee benefit plans of tribal
governments and related entities, such as vesting and funding rules. Id. § 906. Although
several earlier pieces of legislation attempted to make clear that the governmental plan
exemption to ERISA and related Code provisions should be available to tribal
government plans, see, e.g., H.R. 331, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 2830, 109th Cong. (2006);
S. 673, 109th Cong. (2006), what emerged from the Conference Committee and was
ultimately enacted into law appears to almost completely remove the availability of the
exemption for tribes and related entities. Interestingly, however, section 906 of the Act
provides that a
governmental plan [will include] a plan which is established and maintained by an
Indian tribal government ... a subdivision of an Indian tribal government.., or an
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recent pronouncement provides an opening for Congress to act on the
issue of tribal tax-exempt bonds. To continue to deny tribal
governments the ability to issue tax-exempt debt on the same basis as
state and local governments is to continue to expose the Tax Code as
vulnerable to the charge of racism.
Under the status quo, the Tax Code and the IRS are
systematically discriminating against tribal governments relative to
state and local governments. Congress has the opportunity to rectify
this differential treatment simply by rewriting § 7871 to treat tribes as
states for all tax purposes, without qualification. Therefore,
subsections (c), (d), and (e) of § 7871 should be repealed, and
subsection (b) should be amended to read as follows:
(b) Treatment of subdivisions of Indian tribal governments as
political subdivisions. For the purposes specified in subsection
(a), a subdivision of an Indian tribal government shall be
treated as a political subdivision of a State if such subdivision
has been delegated the right to exercise one or more of the
governmental functions of the Indian tribal government.
CONCLUSION
The authority to supplement tax revenue by issuing tax-free debt
obligations is clearly a major part of any state's efforts to develop and
maintain its infrastructure and economy. The policy of self-
determination, along with the legal recognition of tribes as
governments with responsibilities to their constituent populations,
necessitates tax-free bond authority.
Yet tribes, to this day, and as a direct consequence of the
essential governmental function requirement in § 7871, do not enjoy
such authority to any meaningful degree. Not only are these
agency or instrumentality of either, and all of the participants of which are
employees of such entity substantially all of whose services as such an employee
are in the performance of essential government functions but not in the performance
of commercial activities (whether or not an essential government function).
H.R. 4 § 906(a)(1) (emphasis added). This statutory language states that a revenue-
generating activity, although commercial in nature, can still be an essential government
function, thus eviscerating the basis upon which the IRS has generally opposed tax-exempt
bond financings under the "essential governmental function" test. Section 906 itself is
clearly discriminatory, as pension plans for employees of state-run enterprises such as the
liquor store employees of the New Hampshire State Liquor Commission are still able to
enjoy the "governmental plan" exemption from ERISA, but a single employee of a tribal
gift shop for a tribe with no other commercial activities would deny the entire tribe the
ability to have their pension treated as a governmental plan.
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restrictions discriminatory against Indian tribes, inconsistent with the
federal policy of self-determination, and contrary to the legal
recognition of tribes as governments, but also they repress the efforts
of the historically most impoverished, isolated, and disaffected
minority group in the nation to improve their daily lives. Indeed,
although the law now technically grants all tribes tax-exempt bonding
authority, for most tribes the essential governmental function test
renders this power one that exists in theory only.
In response, this Article makes several arguments for expanding
tribal tax-exempt bonding authority. First, state and local
governments use tax-exempt bonds for a wide range of commercial
and economic development activities, and Indian tribes should be
able to take advantage of similar opportunities. Second, the
restrictions in § 7871 constrict the market for tribal tax-exempt bonds
such that the actual number of tribal tax-exempt bonds issued is an
order of magnitude lower than it should be. Third, denying
meaningful tax-exempt bonding authority to tribes costs the federal
government millions of dollars each year and expanding tribal tax-
exempt bonding authority would increase federal tax revenues as well
as reduce welfare transfer payments to Indian Country.
This Article also identifies a significant moral justification for
expanding tribal tax-exempt bonding authority: the elimination of
discriminatory practices that, according to an objective typology, fit
the description of racism, both in terms of the statute and its
legislative history as well as hostile enforcement activity by the IRS.
Ultimately, either rationale should be sufficient to justify amending
§ 7871, as both are supported by empirical evidence, some of which
has never been made available before. For the sake of consistent
federal policy toward Indian tribes, for the sake of tribes' right to
economic independence, and for the sake of eliminating a harmful
and discriminatory law, Congress should act to equalize tribal bond
authority with that of states.
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